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Fiji
In his new year address to the nation, 
Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka urged 
the people of Fiji to make 1996 the 
year of “national consensus.” It was 
perhaps an appropriate refrain, given 
the expected challenges that lay ahead. 
Uppermost in the prime minister’s 
mind was dealing with the findings of 
the Constitution Review Commission. 
Its report was due to be handed to 
President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
sometime in the middle of the year. But 
if 1996 was remarkable for one thing, 
it was the prime minister’s ability to 
confuse and confound political foes 
and allies alike. In a year marked by 
economic gloom and political uncer-
tainty, the prime minister’s quest for 
“national consensus” seemed to raise 
more questions than it answered. How 
serious and genuine was Sitiveni 
Rabuka? More important, was he 
capable of forging national consensus 
in Fiji, providing the strong and 
enlightened leadership so desperately 
needed?
The national consensus initiative 
got off to a rocky start in February, 
when the ruling party, the Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (svt), held 
“National Consensus Talks” with the 
two Indian opposition parties, the 
National Federation Party (nfp) and 458the Fiji Labour Party. It was expected 
that these would continue in the lead-
up to the handing over of the Constitu-
tion Review Commission report. But 
overshadowing the national consensus 
talks was the government’s handling of 
the highly charged land issue. Agricul-
tural leases are due to expire in 1997, 
under the Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenants Act (alta). In February, leader 
of the House of Representatives and 
government backbencher Koresi Mata-
tolu announced that his newly formed 
Fijian Canegrowers Association would 
campaign for the nonrenewal of cane 
leases for Indian farmers. He also 
claimed that Fijian cane farmers (who 
currently make up about 25 percent of 
the farmers) would “take over the 
sugar industry by the year 2000.” 
What incensed the Indian opposition 
was the government’s (and Rabuka’s) 
silence in the wake of these claims and 
their failure to censure Matatolu. 
Instead there was a general plea from 
the deputy prime minister for “greater 
sensitivity” on all sides.
By March “Fijian unity” seemed to 
have replaced “national consensus” as 
the government’s first priority. The 
Fijian Association Party leader, Jose-
fata Kamikamica, failed yet again in 
his bid to win the Tailevu seat in the 
House of Representatives, his third 
loss since the general elections in 1994 
and the second in a by-election. He 
lost to the svt candidate, Ratu Manasa 
Seniloli. Immediately after the by-elec-
tion, Rabuka offered the Fijian Associ-
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partnership with the Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei. The offer was 
made through President Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara. It was suggested by 
Rabuka that Kamikamica could be 
given a seat in cabinet through 
appointment to the Senate. Observers 
speculated that Rabuka’s invitation to 
the Fijian Association Party, which 
caught everyone—not least Kami-
kamica—by surprise, was motivated 
by Rabuka’s need for Kamikamica’s 
help in managing the nation’s eco-
nomic problems. It was also suggested 
that Kamikamica’s entry to the cabinet 
might have a “calming effect” on the 
Indian opposition, insofar as he was 
regarded as a moderate on constitu-
tional issues. But there was also the 
possibility that this was part of a ploy 
by Rabuka to exert control and lever-
age over the svt caucus—a way to 
ensure cooperation and unity within 
caucus when dealing with issues like 
the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants 
Act and the constitution.
Whatever the intention, the initia-
tive failed to materialize and the coali-
tion talks broke down after barely 
beginning. In April, Rabuka accused 
the Fijian Association Party of setting 
conditions, including the requirement 
that Kamikamica be the coalition 
leader. It was later found that Rabuka 
had based his claims on inaccurate 
media reports and no such condition 
had been made. Rabuka also stated 
that talks with the opposition leader, 
Jai Ram Reddy, were going well, 
removing the need for a coalition with 
the Fijian Association Party. But while 
the idea of a government of national 
unity was being bandied around in the media, there was no consensus on the 
prime minister’s position on the issue. 
As one observer noted, “No one can 
recollect whether Rabuka had actually 
mentioned a government of national 
unity in any definitive form” (Review, 
May 1996, 20).
The prospects for a marriage 
between the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa 
ni Taukei and the Fijian Association 
Party seemed to be killed by the death 
of Ratu Manasa Seniloli, the newly 
elected representative for Tailevu. 
Known to be terminally ill at the time 
of the election, his death only weeks 
into his term unexpectedly forced the 
issue of whether or not to field a joint 
svt-fap candidate. Rabuka had 
mooted the idea in the media the 
previous month, suggesting that 
Kamikamica could be nominated 
unopposed for the seat in any future 
by-election. In May, talks led by svt 
powerbroker Inoke Kubuabola were 
held with the Fijian Association Party 
on the issue of a joint candidate. But 
Rabuka was reportedly against the 
idea, stating that he did not need the 
Fijian Association Party. Both parties 
subsequently fielded separate candi-
dates.
The Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei nominated former Commis-
sioner Western Lagisoa Delana, while 
the Fijian Association Party decided to 
try a new tack and nominated Bau 
high chief Ratu Epenisa Cakobau 
instead of Kamikamica. The Fijian 
Association Party hoped that the 
Cakobau name would carry enough 
weight to swing the votes in their 
favor. This was not to be, and the 
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei 
once again scored a victory in the by-
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divisions in the chiefly establishment, 
the svt candidate had been strongly 
supported by the two powerful sisters 
of the Fijian Association Party’s candi-
date, Adi Litia Cakobau and Adi 
Samanunu Talakuli.
While the two Fijian parties failed 
to resolve their differences, there were 
signs of greater cooperation between 
the Fijian Association Party and other 
political parties. The Fijian Association 
Party invited nfp leader Jai Ram 
Reddy to address a fundraising dinner 
in May, and there was agreement 
between the National Federation Party, 
the Fijian Association Party, the Fiji 
Labour Party, and the General Electors 
Party to field joint candidates in the 
up-coming municipal elections, under 
the banner of a new Ratepayers’ Asso-
ciation.
The Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei, meanwhile, indicated that it 
might be prepared to change the racial 
exclusivity of its party. In May a com-
mittee reviewing its constitution sug-
gested that the party be opened up to 
other races. This was interpreted as a 
revival of the “three-legged stool” con-
cept of the old Alliance Party of Ratu 
Mara, which was a combination of the 
Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance, 
and the General Electors Association. 
Some observers believed the proposal 
was an attempt to instill credibility in 
the government, while others saw it as 
a sign that the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei recognized it could 
not solve the nation’s problems with-
out the participation of all races.
Rabuka’s thoughts on this issue 
were not made public, but he was 
clearly troubled by problems of unity and discipline within his ranks. In 
May, the volatile and unpredictable 
backbencher (and Rabuka’s uncle), 
Militoni Leweniqila, publicly threat-
ened to bring down the Rabuka gov-
ernment. He had made similar threats 
in previous years. Although the out-
burst was quickly quelled, and a public 
and tearful apology made by Lewe-
niqila was accepted, the incident 
appeared to be the catalyst for a cabi-
net reshuffle. Rabuka announced the 
new cabinet line-up in June, the ninth 
in four years. It was widely regarded as 
creating Rabuka’s best cabinet to date, 
with the inclusion of several highly 
competent ministers. Also included 
were some well-known and outspoken 
critics of the prime minister, Leweni-
qila among them. But if Rabuka had 
sought to strengthen party unity with 
his new cabinet line-up, the manner in 
which the reshuffle was announced 
seemed highly provocative. None of 
the cabinet ministers dropped by 
Rabuka were personally informed of 
their removal, and Rabuka flew out of 
the country just hours after finalizing 
the reshuffle. For those former minis-
ters, justifiably dismayed at their 
demotions, this treatment would have 
caused some disquiet and resentment.
The country awaited the release of 
the Constitution Review Commission 
report with some trepidation. The 
Indian opposition parties attempted to 
sound hopeful and optimistic, but this 
was a difficult task given the anti-
Indian tone of the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei’s own submission to 
the commission in October 1995. That 
submission had rejected the need for 
any change to the 1990 constitution. 
According to Jai Ram Reddy, “We take 
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good faith in the decency and good 
faith of all races and I am working on 
that premise. If at the end of the road 
that does not work out, then we will 
look at other options” (Review, May 
1996, 19).
The issue of land and the review of 
the alta legislation highlighted the 
problem of forging national consensus. 
In a poignant reminder of how deep 
the racial gulf remained, Indian 
farmers reported their inability to dis-
cuss the future of their land leases with 
Fijian landowners. One farmer from 
Sabeto admitted he had not held any 
talks with his landowners on the 
renewal of his lease, fearful that doing 
so would cause bad feeling. “What if 
they ask for money to renew? How do 
I react?” (Review, June 1996, 53). 
Confusion and uncertainty prevailed 
on both sides, especially on the issue of 
whether the renewal of leases was 
something to be decided between the 
tenants and the landowners, or by the 
Native Lands Trust Board (nltb, the 
official landlord). There were numer-
ous cases of landowners demanding 
premium payments for the renewal of 
leases, contrary to board policy. Many 
farmers preferred to comply with these 
demands, rather than risk antagoniz-
ing the landowners. There was criti-
cism of the government’s failure to 
clarify the future of land leases and to 
assuage the fears of Indian tenants. A 
survey being carried out by the Native 
Lands Trust Board on the amount of 
land to revert to landowners was not 
expected to be completed until the end 
of the year.
Also testing the government’s will to 
build national consensus was its han-dling of numerous allegations, and 
actual cases, of mismanagement, cor-
ruption, and abuse of office. The 
Native Lands Trust Board itself 
became the focus of a police investiga-
tion after a former assistant auditor 
alleged misuse of a total of f$200 mil-
lion by the board. There was no way 
of immediately verifying the allegation, 
as nltb accounts had not been audited 
since 1989. Other targets of inquiry 
were the Housing Authority and the 
Fiji Public Service Credit Union. In the 
latter case it was revealed that office 
bearers had taken out loans far in 
excess of the value of their shares. But 
it was the National Bank of Fiji, 
declared “technically insolvent” in 
1995, that created the most political 
and economic waves. In March it was 
revealed by the new management that 
the problem of bad loans, previously 
thought to be f$120 million, actually 
stood at f$220 million. It was esti-
mated that up to f$160 million would 
have to be written off. As a way of 
managing this, the bank would be 
restructured into a good bank (a per-
sonal bank) and a bad bank (an asset 
management bank), which would serve 
as a specialized recovery unit. A gov-
ernment bond would be issued to buy 
the problem loans and transfer them to 
the bad bank. It would also be neces-
sary, as part of cost-cutting efforts, to 
implement staff redundancies.
What infuriated the public, the 
unions, and the opposition parties was 
the government’s refusal to take action 
against those in positions of authority, 
who were ultimately responsible for 
what has emerged as the biggest finan-
cial disaster in Fiji’s history. They 
included former Finance Minister (and 
462 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997current Home Affairs Minister) Paul 
Manueli. Instead the bank’s employees 
looked set to pay the price for the folly 
and greed of their superiors. About 
340 workers were to be made redun-
dant. In July, as parliament began 
debating the National Bank of Fiji 
restructuring bill, bank workers went 
on strike in protest against the size of 
the redundancy package offered by 
management. It became one of the 
longest running strikes in recent years. 
After two weeks, a compromise pack-
age of f$7.8 million was agreed to, but 
not before Prime Minister Rabuka pro-
voked public outrage by suggesting 
that civil servants should perhaps take 
a 2.5 percent pay cut to help keep the 
bank workers on board. This went 
down like the proverbial lead balloon 
with the Fiji Public Servants Associa-
tion, which had a 3.5 percent pay raise 
pending.
In parliament, both the National 
Federation Party and the Fiji Labour 
Party sought to capitalize on the public 
anger over the National Bank scandal. 
Jai Ram Reddy planned to move a 
motion of no confidence in Paul 
Manueli. This was deferred until the 
September session. Labour leader 
Mahendra Chaudhary called for the 
resignation of the governor of the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji. Most observers 
remained skeptical that police investi-
gations into cases of fraud at the 
National Bank would lead to success-
ful prosecutions.
As the Constitution Review Com-
mission neared the completion of its 
report, there seemed to emerge a 
renewed spirit of consensus, at least 
among the main political parties. This 
was evident with the decision taken by Reddy in August to not pursue his 
motion of no confidence in Manueli 
over his role in the bank scandal. 
Ostensibly this was because the prime 
minister would be overseas at the time. 
But it was apparent that Reddy’s (and 
Rabuka’s) main concern was not to 
sour relations in parliament as it pre-
pared to receive the commission’s 
report, and not to undermine unity in 
Rabuka’s cabinet. The other sign of 
political consensus was far more self-
serving. Government and opposition 
parties in parliament voted over-
whelmingly in favor of a pay raise for 
parliamentarians, which had been 
recommended by the Parliamentary 
Emoluments and Benefits Committee, 
chaired by prominent businessman 
Lionel Yee. The pay increase would 
cost an estimated f$700,000, with 
remuneration for cabinet ministers and 
the opposition leader increasing by 44 
percent.
There was no dissent in parliament 
on the recommendations, although 
outside parliament the move caused 
widespread consternation, if not con-
tempt. Some union leaders vowed to 
follow the parliamentarians’ example 
and push for their workers to receive 
comparable pay increases. Then, in an 
embarrassing about-face, Rabuka 
ordered that the raise be put on hold. 
It had been brought to his attention 
that increases in field allowances for 
soldiers serving in peacekeeping opera-
tions, approved in 1993, had so far not 
been implemented because the govern-
ment could not afford the increase. But 
there were questions about the “legal-
ity” of Rabuka’s actions in stopping 
legislation that had been agreed to by 
parliament, and the cabinet later ruled 
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should go ahead.
September saw the long-awaited 
release of the Constitution Review 
Commission report. The three com-
missioners, Chairman Sir Paul Reeves, 
Dr Brij Lal, and Mr Tomasi Vakatora, 
handed their 699-page unanimous 
report to the president on 6 September. 
The day before the report was tabled 
in parliament its contents were leaked 
to the Fiji Post newspaper. This was 
the first indication that the commission 
had recommended far-reaching 
changes to Fiji’s constitution. Full 
details were not available until after 
the tabling of the report on 10 Septem-
ber at a joint sitting of parliament that 
was addressed by the president, the 
prime minister, and the leader of the 
opposition and witnessed by an 
impressive gathering of business lead-
ers, public servants, senior diplomats, 
the media, and academics. Later that 
day the government hosted a gala 
party on the grounds of parliament, to 
celebrate the release of the report and 
perhaps demonstrate its goodwill and 
commitment to the review process, 
whatever the contents of the report 
might be. But not everybody was in a 
celebratory mood that day.
While many had expected, and per-
haps hoped, that the three commis-
sioners would agree to recommend a 
move away from the overwhelmingly 
communal nature of the country’s elec-
toral system and the racial biases 
inherent in the 1990 constitution, no 
one fully anticipated the breadth of 
change that was being proposed. The 
commission had boldly defined a new 
vision for Fiji, one that aimed to 
ensure that all racial groups could feel confident and secure in the land of 
their birth. The report, titled Fiji: 
Towards a United Future, had at its 
core the position that all races must be 
able to share in the government of the 
country, and this required the emer-
gence of multiethnic parties or coali-
tions, which was not possible under 
the present communal electoral sys-
tem. In order to promote multiethnic 
power sharing, the commission recom-
mended the introduction of a common 
roll system for 45 seats in the 70-seat 
House of Representatives. The remain-
der should be communal (at least for 
the time being) and be allocated 
according to population as follows: 12 
Fijian seats, 10 Indian seats, 2 general 
electors’ seats, and 1 Rotuman seat. 
While the Upper House would not be 
based on ethnicity, the provinces 
would form the bases of the constitu-
encies, with two candidates elected 
from each province. This system would 
probably favor Fijians.
On the question of Fijian para-
mountcy, the Constitution Review 
Commission’s position was that while 
Fijian interests needed to be given spe-
cial protection, this should not be 
through relegating other races to a 
lesser status. “We find no basis on 
which the paramountcy of Fijian inter-
ests or Fijian political paramountcy 
can be elevated into a right,” the com-
missioners declared. Thus, apart from 
the position of president, no positions 
or proportions of public offices should 
be reserved for people of a particular 
race. The approach they recommended 
was “entrenchment” in the constitu-
tion of provisions concerning Fijian 
interests relating to land, natural 
resources, chiefly titles, customary law, 
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rent system, policy over such areas 
may be subject to amendment or 
appeal by act of parliament. Entrench-
ment was also recommended for the 
role and powers of the Bose Levu Vaka 
Turaga (the Great Council of Chiefs). 
Among other things, the commission 
recommended that the Great Council 
of Chiefs be given direct power to veto 
legislation that might affect Fijian 
interests. In general the commission 
elevated the Great Council of Chiefs to 
a position of political power not cur-
rently enjoyed under the present con-
stitution. This was seen as providing 
greater protection for Fijian interests 
than the current system provided.
Sensing the need for calm, both the 
president and the prime minister 
sought to allay Fijian fears that what 
was being recommended would harm 
their interests. Addressing the joint sit-
ting of parliament, Rabuka said, “The 
country needs a constitution that gave 
all citizens a feeling that this is their 
home” (IB, Oct 1996, 37). He also 
mentioned the need to meet interna-
tional obligations and to restore local 
and foreign business confidence. But it 
was clear that building consensus 
around this report would not be an 
easy task. The immediate challenge 
came from within Rabuka’s own party, 
when a number of prominent svt par-
liamentarians and cabinet ministers 
voiced their strong disapproval of the 
report “because the crc has totally 
rejected and disregarded the party’s 
submission.” It was even suggested by 
some that Rabuka should not chair the 
Parliamentary Select Committee that 
would consider the report, because his 
pro-multiracial stance would compro-mise Fijian interests. Rabuka’s 
response to this was unequivocal: “As 
Prime Minister I wish to ensure the 
success of consensus building within 
the committee. I need to be there” (FT, 
24 Sept 1996, 1).
Fijian politicians from other politi-
cal parties, including the Fijian Associ-
ation Party, the Vanua Independent 
Party, and the Fijian Nationalist Party 
of Sakeasi Butadroka, found common 
cause with the svt hardliners in oppos-
ing the Constitution Review Commis-
sion’s recommendations. The prime 
minister was condemned for forsaking 
the cause of the 1987 coup. This 
forced Rabuka to issue an ultimatum 
to government ministers who were 
speaking against the report: those who 
preferred the path of the Fijian Nation-
alist Party and others advocating civil 
unrest should resign. None did.
The other main challenge came 
from the provincial councils. Rabuka’s 
own province of Cakaudrove voted to 
reject the report “because it did not 
protect Fijian rights.” This meeting 
had been chaired by svt hardliner and 
Deputy Prime Minister Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola. While some provinces 
voted as Cakaudrove did, others 
decided to wait for the recommenda-
tions of special council committees, 
which would study the report and pro-
vide a more informed opinion to the 
provincial councils. This approach was 
adopted by Lau, but only after strong 
pressure from President Ratu Mara 
and Lauan Senator Filipe Bole. Ratu 
Mara reportedly warned delegates to 
the Lau Provincial Council: “If anyone 
is contemplating throwing out this 
report, I have a good mind to do the 
same to him” (FT, 8 Oct 1996, 5).
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international opinion, were clearly 
pleased with the report’s findings, 
although none wanted to sound too 
confident. Nfp leader Jai Ram Reddy 
preferred to remain circumspect in his 
comments, declaring that he did not 
want to preempt the deliberations of 
the Parliamentary Select Committee. 
Reddy had agreed with Rabuka that 
the committee should meet in camera, 
with no reporting of its deliberations 
until its work was done. It was also 
agreed that normal parliamentary ses-
sions, after the budget session in 
November-December, should be sus-
pended until the committee completed 
its work. This is expected to be around 
March 1997. The review process needs 
to be completed by July 1997, as stipu-
lated in the 1990 Constitution. The 
task of the Select Committee is to agree 
on the recommendations of the report, 
to be adopted by parliament through 
an amendment to the 1990 Constitu-
tion. The committee’s recommenda-
tions must first be approved by the 
Great Council of Chiefs. The Select 
Committee comprises 24 members 
from the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei, the National Federation Party, 
the Fiji Labour Party, the Fijian Associ-
ation Party, and the General Electors 
or General Voters Parties.
If Rabuka was disappointed that the 
Constitution Review Commission 
report had seemingly shown little 
regard for the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei’s submission, he did 
not show it. His statements reiterated 
the national consensus theme: “The 
stance of Fiji for the Fijians won’t 
work” (Review, Nov 1996, 15). He 
also publicly condemned the Fijian Nationalist Party and newly revived 
Taukei Movement for their threats of 
civil unrest. There was speculation that 
the prime minister was finally rising 
above communal and racial politics. 
However when the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei suffered a crushing 
defeat in the municipal elections in late 
September, against the multiracial 
Ratepayers’ Association, Rabuka was 
quick to blame the common roll elec-
toral system, among other things, for 
its poor showing. Such a system, he 
said, did not guarantee Fijian represen-
tation for Fijians. Claiming that Fijians 
needed to have seats reserved for them, 
he suggested amendments to the Local 
Government Act to allow the appoint-
ment of village representatives on 
municipal councils. This response 
struck at the heart of the approach 
advocated by the Constitution Review 
Commission in its report and led the 
Fiji Times to editorialize that “the call 
was a throwback to [the prime minis-
ter’s] philosophy at the time of the 
coups: if you can’t win, change the 
rules.”
In what was probably his most sur-
prising performance of the year, 
Rabuka broke down and cried at a 
Christian interdenominational thanks-
giving service in November. The tears 
were shed, he said, in asking for for-
giveness from the people of Fiji. He 
would not specify, though, what he 
was asking forgiveness for. Some spec-
ulated that perhaps he should be ask-
ing forgiveness for the shocking 
revelations in the Auditor General’s 
Report for 1993–94 (released in late 
October), which chronicled wide-
spread mismanagement and abuse of 
office by government officials, includ-
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tism was found to be rife. The result 
was considerable loss of revenue from 
government coffers (and taxpayers’ 
pockets). More worrying perhaps was 
a loss of morale and a creeping culture 
of corruption. The main problem was 
seen to be laxity in taking disciplinary 
measures and in following proper pro-
cedures and guidelines.
Following closely on the heels of the 
auditor general’s report was the first of 
the high-profile prosecutions in the 
National Bank of Fiji saga, involving 
senior bank management, business-
people, and politicians. Appearing in 
court for the first time were former 
National Bank of Fiji General 
Manager Visanti Makrava, two svt 
parliamentarians (and former cabinet 
ministers) Koresi Matatolu and Ratu 
Ovini Bokini, and prominent fishing 
company executive Graham South-
wick. While Matatolu was charged 
with fraudulent conversion of 
f$200,000, Ratu Ovini was charged 
with official corruption—accepting 
bribes from Southwick among other 
things. All the accused pleaded 
innocent, but Matatolu was eventu-
ally forced to stand down from his 
position as leader of the House of 
Representatives.
The state of the economy in 1996 
was perhaps also cause for tears. In 
January, Minister for Trade and Com-
merce Jim Ah Koy confidently pre-
dicted that “1996 is going to be the 
year of the turnaround” for the Fiji 
economy (Review, Feb 1996, 23). He 
cited as evidence the number of new 
projects that would see fruition that 
year, including the Namosi copper 
mine, Vulani—a new tourism develop-ment near Nadi, and the recently 
privatized shipyard. Unfortunately, by 
the end of 1996, Placer (the company 
developing the Namosi copper mine) 
had announced that it was withdraw-
ing from Fiji because it had been 
unable to find a partner to share the 
risk. Placer had raised hopes, at one 
time, of generating around f$600 mil-
lion a year from the Namosi venture. 
The government’s first case of privati-
zation also proved a disaster when the 
New Zealand partner in the shipyard 
deal announced it had gone into 
receivership and was pulling out. No 
investors came forward in the Vulani 
development, although the nearby 
Denarau resort was taken over by new 
owners with the promise of major new 
development. Meanwhile the Levuka-
based Pacific Fishing Company was 
forced to shut down, laying off five 
hundred workers (until the govern-
ment injected an emergency cash flow 
of f$5 million into the company). The 
company’s problems included poor 
productivity, erratic tuna supply, com-
petition from other producers, and loss 
of markets overseas.
There were few positive economic 
indicators in 1996. On the bright side, 
Emperor Gold Mine announced plans 
to open two more mines on Viti Levu. 
Garment manufacturers anticipated a 
boom in exports in the next few years, 
rising from f$200 million to f$500 
million by the year 2000. The long-
term future of the industry looked 
increasingly uncertain, however, given 
the unwillingness of Australia and 
New Zealand to relax the rules of ori-
gin under the sparteca trade agree-
ment. Cane production in 1996 was 
high, but the industry reported a loss 
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duction and low sugar content of cane. 
On the other hand, a severe decline 
was reported in the retail sector, and 
the property market remained 
depressed. Lack of consumer confi-
dence was pervasive, and business-
people worried about the inaction of 
the government, especially its failure to 
implement any of the recommenda-
tions of the 1995 Economic Summit. 
In response to such criticism, Rabuka 
released a budget strategy document in 
May, titled Action Now. It stated that 
the government would aim for a bal-
anced budget by the year 2000, and set 
a 3 percent growth rate for the next 
four years.
The budget, handed down in 
November, was notable for being the 
first billion-dollar budget in Fiji’s his-
tory but also, more disturbingly, for 
having the highest deficit to date 
(f$219.7 million or 8.2 percent of 
gross domestic product). It included a 
provision of f$133 million for the 
National Bank of Fiji’s “bad bank.” 
The national debt was estimated to be 
f$1.167 billion, with an annual inter-
est of f$108.8 million. Opposition 
parties warned that the country was 
heading toward bankruptcy. The gov-
ernment set 1999 as its target for 
achieving a balanced budget. But with 
no new tax raises or spending cuts, it 
was difficult to see how this would be 
realized. One revenue-generating idea, 
the dubious Asia Business Migration 
scheme, was revived by cabinet. It is a 
deal between the government and a 
Hong Kong–based company that will 
allow a maximum of seven thousand 
four-person “units” into the country, 
each paying us$30,000 as an initial investment. A second investment of 
us$100,000 would later be required, 
paid into an investment account 
administered by the Hong Kong–based 
company.
Addressing the fundamental eco-
nomic problems of the nation will, 
however, require more substantive 
measures. What many regarded as 
Fiji’s principal problems—low invest-
ment levels by the private sector 
coupled with unemployment and 
poverty—may only be alleviated 
through the resolution of political 
issues: the constitutional review, the 
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants 
Act, greater accountability in govern-
ment, and an improvement in its over-
all economic management.
As the year drew to a close, many in 
Fiji were probably pleased to see the 
end of 1996 and hoped for a better 
1997. It had been a shocking year for 
the unprecedented number of road 
deaths (112) and reported violent 
crime, including gang rapes and mur-
ders. Race relations did not seem any 
better, with a number of reported cases 
of vandalism and theft at Hindu tem-
ples and other places of worship. 
Migration figures revealed a continu-
ing high number of Indians leaving the 
country (4463 in 1995, out of a total 
of 4931 emigrants that year). With 
many Fijians probably uneasy at the 
recommendations of the Constitution 
Review Commission, it falls on all par-
ties to promote reconciliation and 
compromise. But perhaps most critical 
is the role and leadership of Rabuka. 
Will there be a satisfactory outcome to 
the constitution review process and the 
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act 
in 1997? Much depends on the prime 
468 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997minister. Whether he has the fortitude, 
goodwill, and determination to bring it 
off remains to be seen.
Sandra Tarte
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Irian Jaya
During 1996 Irian Jaya featured even 
more prominently in the national and 
international media than during the 
previous year, when reports of human 
rights abuses in the area of the Free-
port mine had brought the easternmost 
province of the Republic of Indonesia 
under the closest international scrutiny 
since its incorporation in 1969. Free-
port was in the news again in 1996, 
when rioting in the townships of Tem-
bagapura and Timika forced the mine 
to close briefly, but the outstanding 
media event of the year was the taking 
of twenty-four hostages—seven of 
them European—at Mapnduma by 
guerrillas of the Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka (opm). A compound of media 
attention during the previous year, the 
presence of a large press contingent 
over the five months of the Mapnduma 
hostage crisis, and the continuing 
development of Internet and other 
communications links, produced an 
unprecedented flow of information 
about the province. This information is 
of variable quality, and reports of the 
same event from different sources 
rarely concur, but the net result has been that events in Irian Jaya are now 
more openly reported and more widely 
discussed than ever before.
A series of clashes between the mili-
tary and the Organisasi Papua Mer-
deka in the vicinity of Timika and the 
Freeport mine during late 1994 and 
early 1995 had resulted in an undeter-
mined number of deaths among the 
local Amungme community. Reports 
of up to seventy-seven deaths and a 
number of other serious human rights 
abuses during this period made inter-
national news after the release of suc-
cessive reports, first by the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid in April 
1995 and then by the Bishop of the 
Jayapura diocese, Monsignor Mun-
ninghoff, in August 1995. Investigative 
missions by the Australian and United 
States embassies and by the National 
Commission for Human Rights (Kom-
nas Ham) could find no evidence for 
the direct involvement of Freeport 
security personnel in these events, but 
forced the army, which had denied the 
veracity of the reports, to launch its 
own investigations. Four soldiers—a 
lieutenant and three privates—were 
arrested and appeared before a mili-
tary court in January 1996 in connec-
tion with a massacre near Hoea 
village, where between three (the 
army’s estimate) and eleven people had 
been killed; the privates were sen-
tenced in February to jail terms rang-
ing between one and three years, the 
officer to a sixteen-month term. A fur-
ther consequence of this trial was the 
release of a fifteen-page booklet by the 
chief of the regional Trikora Regional 
Command, Major-General Dunidja, 
outlining the army’s code for conduct 
in relation to human rights.
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traced between the events of 1994–95 
and the taking of the hostages at Map-
nduma by the Organisasi Papua Mer-
deka. The local opm leader, Kelik 
(“Kelly”) Kwalik, was an Amungme 
who had lost at least four family mem-
bers during the 1994–95 killings. The 
targeting of Europeans as hostages 
appears to have been part of a deliber-
ate policy aimed at drawing the atten-
tion of a larger audience to the 
grievances of the general Timika area. 
On 8 January 1996, a large contingent 
of some two hundred men, armed for 
the most part with bows and arrows, 
took twenty-four people hostage in the 
village of Mapnduma, 160 kilometers 
east of Timika. Among the hostages 
were two teams of researchers: a joint 
expedition from Cambridge Univer-
sity and the Jakarta Biological Sciences 
Club, and a smaller World Wildlife 
Fund for Nature (wwf) team pursuing 
a long-term project in conjunction 
with local communities aimed at 
improving the viability of the Lorentz 
Natural Reserve. In all, seven Europe-
ans (four British, two Dutch, and a 
German) and four non-Irianese Indo-
nesians were taken, along with several 
of their Irianese colleagues and assis-
tants, and a large number of Map-
nduma villagers.
News of the kidnappings was 
greeted by international headlines that 
suggested a lack of editorial familiarity 
with the people, let alone the location, 
of Irian Jaya: “Brit Students in ‘Lost 
World’ Kidnap Terror,” “4 Held by 
Head-Shrink Tribe” (DM, 11 Jan 
1996). Senior army officers, including 
Brigadier-General Prabowo Subianto, 
commander of the elite Kopassus brigade and son-in-law of President 
Suharto, assembled in the nearest gov-
ernment centers at Wamena and 
Timika, together with detectives from 
Scotland Yard. Despite some initial 
announcements to the contrary, the 
army soon settled for a strategy of 
negotiation with the hostage-takers, 
who insisted on dealing only with 
Christian mission contacts. Although 
varying lists of demands were released 
by opm leaders living in exile, the con-
ditions set by the hostage-taking party 
included recognition of the indepen-
dent state of West Papua and a plane; 
neither demand was acceptable to the 
Indonesian authorities, and the ensu-
ing stalemate promised a standoff of 
some duration. Fourteen of the hos-
tages, all of them villagers from Mapn-
duma, were released within the first 
two weeks, together with German 
Frank Momberg (wwf), who was 
handed over to the missionaries to act 
as an intermediary on the understand-
ing that he return to captivity (a condi-
tion that was later waived).
Though the leader of the group that 
had initially taken the hostages was 
Daniel Yudas Kogoya, of the local 
Nduga community, Kelly Kwalik had 
clearly assumed control by 25 January, 
when he met with Bishop Munning-
hoff. Shortly after that meeting, which 
failed to secure the release of any other 
hostages, contact with the hostage 
party became increasingly sporadic. 
Not until 23 February was another 
meeting held, this time under the aus-
pices of the International Center for 
the Red Cross, whose representative 
Henry Fournier entered into a mara-
thon series of negotiations that ran 
intermittently for almost eleven weeks. 
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the Organisasi Papua Merdeka was 
never clearly established; at times 
Kwalik and other members of the 
Mapnduma unit would allude to an 
immediate superior based in neighbor-
ing Papua New Guinea, identified 
widely by others as Moses Weror. 
However a letter from Weror, secured 
by the Red Cross at a meeting with 
him on 9 March, which demanded the 
immediate release of the hostages, was 
pointedly ignored by Kwalik. As with 
most other opm units still operating in 
Irian Jaya, Kwalik’s group appears to 
have acted largely independently of 
any other unit.
Visits to the hostages by Red Cross 
doctors monitored the slow decline of 
their health, but a sense of urgency in 
the negotiation process developed out 
of concern for Martha Klein, who had 
been four months pregnant when 
taken hostage. Events moved quickly 
after 8 May, when a handover cere-
mony at the hamlet of Geselama, 
brokered by the Red Cross, was called 
off at the last minute by Kwalik. The 
Red Cross formally withdrew from 
further negotiation, and the army, 
smarting from having been sidelined 
during much of the crisis, moved 
immediately into action. Pilotless 
drone aircraft located the hostage 
party using infrared sensors that 
detected heat from bodies and
fires. A week later, on 15 May, the 
hostage-takers, who had been on the 
move for days, broke into flight from 
approaching Kopassus soldiers; in a 
confusing series of events, nine of the 
eleven remaining hostages ran for free-
dom, but two of the Indonesian hos-
tages, Navy Panekenan and Yosias Lasamahu, were killed by their 
captors.
The foreign hostages were returned 
to their respective countries after an 
emotional funeral for their two col-
leagues in Java. The British press 
excelled itself in an orgy of tabloid 
journalism, writing of “savage” “Stone 
Age rebels” in their “jungle hell” 
indulging in “wild hypnotic dancing” 
and wielding “poison arrows” to 
threaten “pretty brunette” hostages 
(DM, 17, 20 May 1996; Guardian, 17 
May 1996). The army, which was 
widely praised for its role by the Indo-
nesian parliament, the governments of 
the foreign hostages, and the World 
Wildlife Fund for Nature, promoted all 
those troops involved.
Less heralded were some of the inci-
dental casualties of the Mapnduma 
hostage crisis. In the course of military 
operations during the crisis, three 
young Nduga boys were killed, and 
three more wounded on 12 March 
when playing with grenades left in 
Kenyam village. Reprisals for these 
and other incidents resulted in the kill-
ing of two soldiers on 14 April; the 
following morning, when their bodies 
were brought to an airport hangar in 
Timika, a Kopassus soldier apparently 
went berserk, killing sixteen and 
wounding another fourteen. The dead 
were mostly Kopassus soldiers, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Adel Gustimigo, the 
commander of the antiterrorist 
Detachment 81, being among them, 
but they also included an Airfast pilot 
from New Zealand and four other 
civilians. A ban has since been placed 
on visits to the Lorentz Natural 
Reserve and on walking trips to the 
area of the Carstenz glaciers and, with 
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May, the army has continued to pursue 
the Kwalik group in an arena that is
no longer the focus of international 
attention.
Although the Mapnduma hostage 
crisis attracted more attention from the 
international press than any other 
event in Irian Jaya since the death of 
Michael Rockefeller in 1961, other 
equally newsworthy events that 
occurred during the crisis received little 
coverage. The two most notable 
events, in terms of mortality alone, 
were the reports during February and 
March of the deaths of at least 229 
people in a series of respiratory-related 
epidemics in the Jayawijaya regency in 
which Mapnduma lies, and the loss of 
more than 100 lives and destruction of 
over two thousand homes in a massive 
earthquake and tidal wave that rocked 
Biak on 17 February.
There was also a telling contrast in 
the limited international coverage 
accorded to three other hostage-taking 
events during 1996. Two Indonesian 
high school students, captured by the 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Novem-
ber 1995 and taken across the border 
to Papua New Guinea, were finally 
released unharmed on 28 January 
1996 after the Indonesian authorities 
rejected a ransom demand of rp34 
million. In February, a French mining 
geologist working for PT Nabire 
Bhakti and his Irianese assistant were 
kidnapped in the West Paniai area by 
an opm unit led by the Yogi brothers, 
but released, also unharmed, after one 
night. The third kidnapping occurred 
on 15 August, when the Yogi brothers 
took seventeen employees of the tim-
ber company, PT Kamundan Raya, a subsidiary of the Djajanti Group, from 
their camp in the West Mimika area, 
some 60 kilometers west of Timika. 
Pursued by the military, who managed 
to kill Titus Orop Yogi on 22 August, 
the captors released their hostages in 
several batches until 18 September, 
when the last two hostages were found 
murdered; the rest of the hostage-
taking party escaped. Initially, the mili-
tary had identified the hostage-taking 
as an apolitical act of banditry, but 
documents found on the body of Titus 
Yogi were regarded as firm evidence of 
opm links. Armed Forces Commander 
General Feisal Tanjung entered into a 
war of words with walhi, the national 
umbrella organization for environmen-
tal nongovernment organizations, 
when he suggested a link between 
them and the Djajanti kidnapping. 
Meanwhile the Amungme leader, Tom 
Beanal, was forced to strenuously deny 
the role reported for him, by both the 
military and overseas opm represen-
tatives, of spokesman for the Yogi 
brothers’ group. Following the Dja-
janti kidnapping, the army required all 
timber companies working in the 
Timika area to accept a military secu-
rity presence or face a ban on further 
logging activity, resulting in the sus-
pension in October of Djajanti’s opera-
tions in the area.
Mineral resource companies operat-
ing in Irian Jaya kept pace with the 
nationwide boom in exploration and 
development. British Gas announced a 
major find of natural gas at its Muturi 
concession in Bintuni Bay, while Atlan-
tic Richfield reported a trebling of the 
estimate of reserves at its enormous 
gas field in the adjacent Wiriagar con-
cession, a find that caused some 
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Indonesian government was then 
bolstering its claim to the Natuna gas 
field, in the South China Sea, by link-
ing the development of Natuna to a 
series of ambitious industrial projects. 
One of these projects, the brainchild of 
State Minister of Research and Tech-
nology B J Habibie, involves the clear-
ance of the vast Lakes Plains area of 
Irian Jaya and the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam across the Mamber-
amo River. During a state visit to Indo-
nesia by Germany’s Chancellor Kohl in 
October, a memorandum of under-
standing was signed by the two coun-
tries relating to the Mamberamo 
Project, which will ultimately power a 
regional industrial center. By Decem-
ber, the decision had been taken to 
develop both the Natuna and the Bin-
tuni Bay fields simultaneously.
PT Freeport Indonesia, the devel-
oper of the single largest and most 
valuable mining complex in Indonesia 
at its Grasberg mine and “Golden Tri-
angle” of orebodies in the Tem-
bagapura area, was again the center of 
most of the province’s mining activity. 
During 1996, the company announced 
an increase in proven and provable 
reserves of 600 million tonnes and 
plans for the expansion of mill 
throughput from 120,000 to 200,000 
metric tonnes per day. Positive results 
were also declared from drilling pro-
grams at Freeport Indonesia’s major 
new prospect at Wabu, to the north of 
the Grasberg mine, and at the Kucing 
Liar prospect within the Golden Trian-
gle. The results of an audit by Dames 
& Moore of the company’s environ-
mental performance were made public 
in April and played an important role in the reinstatement of its political risk 
insurance policy, which had been can-
celed during the previous year by the 
US Government’s Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (opic). In 
September, Freeport canceled both its 
opic and World Bank miga insurance 
contracts, a move regarded by analysts 
as a rebuff to opic and an attempt to 
withdraw from the miga policy before 
miga dispatched a field team to inves-
tigate compliance with the terms of the 
policy.
A parallel audit in February of Free-
port Indonesia’s social impacts by 
Labat-Anderson resulted only in a pre-
liminary report, as the audit’s findings 
were rendered irrelevant almost imme-
diately when three days of rioting in 
the townships of Tembagapura and 
Timika forced a temporary shutdown 
of the mine. Such is the world signifi-
cance of Freeport’s copper production 
that the price of copper jumped us$15 
to us$2580 per tonne when news of 
the shutdown broke (Australian, 14 
March 1996). The immediate cause of 
the riots was an accident on 7 March, 
in which a Dani man was injured by a 
Freeport vehicle; although he recov-
ered sufficiently to be released the fol-
lowing day, some of his kinsmen were 
denied access to the hospital to visit 
him. By 9 March a crowd of three hun-
dred had gathered to demand that 
Freeport disband its unpopular secu-
rity force and, after an Amungme 
woman and her child were barred 
from the Tembagapura shopping cen-
ter on 10 March by Freeport security, 
protesters attacked the town’s offices, 
schools, and shops. On 12 March, the 
riot shifted to Timika, where between 
five hundred and three thousand peo-
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ronmental laboratory and other 
facilities, and began to move on the 
airport. The arrival by plane of troops, 
accompanied by Prabowo, forced an 
end to the protests, but not before 
three people had died in a vehicle acci-
dent during the riot. Jim-Bob Moffett, 
the chief executive officer of Freeport 
Indonesia’s parent company, Freeport 
McMoRan, arrived on 13 March and, 
in a meeting held the following day at 
Timika, was confronted with a list of 
demands from forty community repre-
sentatives.
At a promised second meeting on 
13 April, Moffett made an offer of a 
complex package of financial arrange-
ments, which included earmarking 1 
percent of Freeport Indonesia’s annual 
revenue for development programs for 
the local communities over a period of 
ten years (the “Integrated Timika 
Development Plan”), doubling the 
number of its Irianese employees 
within five years, and committing up 
to us$100 million to an environmental 
“clean-up” fund. The initial terms of a 
trust fund supplied by a yearly divi-
dend and a position for local repre-
sentatives at Freeport’s General Share-
holders Meeting were also set out, and 
offers made of a one-off payment of 
rp500 million to each of the seven 
ethnic groups in the vicinity of Free-
port’s Contract of Work area. While 
this offer was being considered by 
community leaders, the leading 
spokesman for the Amungme, Tom 
Beanal, filed a class action lawsuit 
against Freeport in the District Court 
at New Orleans, seeking us$6 billion 
in damages for human rights viola-
tions, “eco-terrorism,” and “cultural genocide.” After ironing out some dif-
ferences with his US lawyer, Martin 
Regan, Beanal flew to Louisiana for a 
preliminary hearing of the suit on 24 
May. On 29 June, the representative 
council of the Amungme, lemasa, 
issued a statement rejecting the offer of 
the “1 percent” package. Freeport, 
which had gone to press after the April 
meeting with the claim that a deal had 
been struck with the communities, had 
sought to preempt this response by 
encouraging the development of an 
alternative representative body for the 
Amungme, amungkal, but a major, 
peaceful demonstration by Amungme 
people in Timika on 18 July made it 
clear that amungkal lacked wide-
spread support for their acceptance of 
the 1 percent offer and the one-off 
payment.
On 12 March, the same day the 
riots spread from Tembagapura to 
Timika, Dr Thomas Wainggai, a senior 
Biak statesman jailed for twenty years 
for his part in a 1988 declaration of 
West Papuan independence, died of 
heart failure while being transferred 
from prison to hospital in Jakarta. On 
18 March, a crowd of some ten thou-
sand people gathered at Sentani to 
meet the plane carrying his body. As 
the cortege passed through Abepura, 
sections of the crowd began to riot; the 
Abepura market, where many of the 
non-Irianese transmigrants sell their 
produce, was gutted by fire, and one 
soldier and four civilians were killed 
before rapid reaction forces from the 
Regional Reserve in Sulawesi and Java 
were flown in. In connection with the 
Abepura riots, 113 people in Jayapura 
and 4 Irianese in Java were arrested; of 
these, 39 were later formally charged. 
474 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997Graffiti written during the Abepura 
riots in support of Kelly Kwalik were 
widely reported by the media.
The same general discontent over 
jobs and other opportunities for Iria-
nese that underlay both the Timika 
and Abepura riots surfaced again in 
the northern coastal town of Nabire. 
Noting that Irianese represented only 
15 percent of the province’s civil ser-
vice in the lower ranks and “even less” 
at higher ranks, Administrative 
Reform Minister T B Silalahi had 
announced in April that a further two 
thousand Irianese would be recruited 
as civil servants in 1996. When a lim-
ited number of appointments were 
made in Nabire on 2 July, a disap-
pointed crowd of two thousand 
attacked government offices, the 
regent’s house, and the local jail; there 
were no fatalities, but thirteen people 
were wounded, and Suharto himself 
reprimanded the local authorities for 
mishandling the situation. One con-
sequence of the riots at Timika, 
Abepura, and Nabire has been the 
announcement by General Feisal Tan-
jung that the Timika area will now 
become a major regional center for the 
armed forces, with an airforce base 
and a permanent army garrison of 
1850 troops at Timika, and a new 
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New Caledonia
The process of negotiating a “consen-
sual solution” for the future of this 
French overseas territory took a new 
turn in 1996, as French Premier Alain 
Juppé rejected the options of either 
independence or association and pro-
posed instead “autonomy” with 
French Polynesia as a model. This 
apparent abrogation of the Matignon 
Accords of 1988 (which provided for a 
referendum on sovereignty in 1998) 
led to intensified mobilization by pro-
independence groups and the tempo-
rary marginalization of Jacques 
Lafleur’s loyalist Rassemblement pour 
la Calédonie dans la République 
(rpcr). By year’s end, however, they 
agreed on “sovereignty shared with 
France.”
After the July 1995 provincial elec-
tions, and the rise in the Territorial 
Congress of dissident loyalists such as 
Didier Leroux, Lafleur had become 
more conciliatory. In January 1996 his 
talks with nationalist leaders of the 
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 
et Socialiste (flnks) produced agree-
ment that control over immigration 
and mineral and marine resources 
should devolve from Paris to the local 
government. Yet the flnks continued 
to demand independence in 1998, 
whereas Lafleur sought a “thirty-year 
pact” with no guarantees of separation 
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Syndicaliste des Travailleurs Kanak
et Exploités (ustke), a multiethnic 
leftist labor movement that openly 
supports Kanak independence, orga-
nized strikes ranging from the
docks to the public broadcasting 
organization.
In February, French Minister for 
Overseas Territories Jean-Jacques de 
Peretti seemed to have agreed with the 
flnks and rpcr to move up the refer-
endum to 1997 and to discuss what 
degree of sovereignty was feasible and 
what paths to follow to develop New 
Caledonia’s economy. Then in April, 
the follow-up committee established 
by the Matignon Accords met in Paris. 
Premier Juppé—whose political style 
has made him unpopular in France 
(European, 17–23 Oct 1996)—
shocked the Kanak nationalists by pro-
posing only greater “autonomy.” Rock 
Wamytan of the flnks withdrew his 
delegation from the talks, denounced 
the perceived breach of the Matignon 
agreements and reaffirmed his party’s 
call for an “irreversible process leading 
to an accession of sovereignty,” begin-
ning with a temporary sharing of 
power through some form of asso-
ciation as a transition to full inde-
pendence (Maclellan and Boengkih 
1996, 5). Lafleur, who has pursued a 
hope that economic development will 
create more jobs and less discontent, 
accused the flnks of seeking an 
impasse in order to make more 
demands later.
In fact, the reference to “associa-
tion” was a compromise, a couching of 
“independence” in pragmatic, less con-
frontational terms. But after the April 
impasse, the flnks replaced its team of 
negotiators with more radical men who voiced a desire to discuss decolo-
nization directly with France, without 
including the rpcr in talks—in effect 
answering Juppé’s extra-Matignon 
ploy with one of their own. Wamytan 
threatened to withdraw from the 
Matignon peace process altogether 
unless Paris reinstated the possibility 
of independence. The flnks also con-
demned as “inadequate” the one-and-
a-half- to five-year sentences handed 
down by the French-run court for 
seven loyalists convicted of burglaries 
and arms-caching with an intent to 
fight Kanak militants. Memories of 
intercommunal violence in the 1980s 
still haunt New Caledonia’s political 
negotiators.
In late June, de Peretti visited 
Noumea for a week, in response to the 
flnks demand for a special envoy to 
get the talks back on track. Wamytan 
urged the minister to help Kanak 
rediscover their identity after a hun-
dred forty years of French colonialism 
and said they would never cease their 
quest for control of their ancestral 
land. De Peretti met with a variety of 
groups, including customary chiefs, 
and left on an optimistic note in early 
July, saying the talks would resume. 
He had apparently reached confiden-
tial agreements with the flnks, and 
shortly after his return to Paris he 
announced that France would indeed 
discuss the future of the territory 
directly with the nationalists. “We 
were surprised by this attitude,” 
Wamytan said, “because it’s a right 
wing in France that has accepted hav-
ing bilateral discussions” (ran, 9 July 
96). The flnks also objected to Yves 
Cabana as French interministerial dele-
gate to New Caledonia, because he 
had previously represented the rpcr in 
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resigned.
On the international front, flnks 
leaders pressed the United Nations 
Decolonization Committee to mediate 
and even to observe the 1998 referen-
dum. Lafleur predicted that tripartite 
negotiations (flnks–Paris–rpcr) 
would resume out of necessity and 
argued that they were an “internal 
matter” for France, not the concern of 
the United Nations. Prime Minister 
Maxime Carlot Korman of Vanuatu 
visited New Caledonia to speak with 
leaders ranging from French High 
Commissioner Dominique Bur to 
Wamytan, but he insisted that his 
country would not become involved in 
the issue of Kanak independence. In 
contrast, Foreign Affairs Minister 
Kilroy Genia of Papua New Guinea 
told the Decolonization Committee 
that the Melanesian Spearhead was 
very concerned about the plight of 
Kanak and called for France to
respect their right to choose inde-
pendence.
Discussions about New Caledonia’s 
social and economic future continued 
as well. The territory is still mostly 
dependent on nickel mining, which 
provides 90 percent of its export earn-
ings, and on hundreds of millions of 
dollars in annual French aid. Plans by 
the local development bureau rely on a 
massive expansion of the nickel indus-
try to create most of the ten thousand 
new jobs hoped for—tourism, fishing, 
cattle raising, and a host of smaller 
projects would account for a much 
smaller proportion (IB, April 1996, 22–
24). Ethnologist Alban Bensa, who has 
worked among Kanak for twenty 
years, criticized the flnks emphasis on the mining industry, tourism, and 
administrative employment, at the 
expense of agriculture or other alterna-
tives, as the late Jean-Marie Tjibaou’s 
“rural” approach would have pro-
moted. Pointing out the educational 
handicaps faced by most Kanak,
Bensa complained that many young 
Kanak have false hopes that indepen-
dence will bring them sudden eco-
nomic success (MD, Feb 96, 7). Leroux, 
head of the dissident loyalist party Une 
Nouvelle Calédonie pour Tous 
(uncpt), warned that massive invest-
ments in the Kanak-dominated North-
ern and Islands Provinces have built up 
infrastructure but done little to help 
the poor: “more than independence, 
we should fear a social explosion” 
(Maclellan and Boengkih 1996, 11).
Even the pro-independence Prot-
estant Church has criticized flnks 
leaders for becoming a new Kanak 
“petty bourgeoisie,” now that they 
have moved into positions of power in 
the provincial governments and Con-
gress. Among the rural and urban poor 
(notably in the growing squatter slums 
around Noumea), drug abuse, teenage 
suicides, and domestic violence are on 
the increase, along with growing 
dependence on imported foods. In 
November, Aloisio Sako, president of 
the Wallisian-dominated Rassemble-
ment Démocratique Océanien (rdo), 
expressed the needs of the immigrant 
minority he represents in Congress by 
asking for more access to jobs, hous-
ing, and education. The rdo is an ally 
of the flnks and the ustke and sup-
ports association in 1998 and ultimate 
independence, but Sako called for the 
emergence of a multiethnic “Caledo-
nian culture” with equal rights for all.
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Union Progressiste Mélanésienne 
(upm) held their annual congresses in 
November, replacing their previous 
presidents with men perceived as more 
supportive of speeding up decoloniza-
tion. François Burcke, well known for 
his gradualist stance, did not even 
attend the uc meetings, saying, “Want-
ing to move quickly is wanting to ruin 
everything instead of seeing the future 
with serenity” (ran, 7 Nov 1996). Ber-
nard Lepeu replaced him as uc presi-
dent and declared, “Yesterday we 
wanted Kanak Socialist Independence; 
we have accepted a compromise in 
being content with a state associated 
with France that concerns all the 
inhabitants of New Caledonia.” But he 
warned that Kanak paramountcy as 
the indigenous people of the country 
cannot be made subordinate to the 
rights accorded by Matignon to “fel-
low victims of history” brought in by 
colonization: “I cannot find my legiti-
macy in the concept of internal auton-
omy.” Victor Tutugoro replaced 
Edmond Nekiriai as head of the upm 
and argued that only the methods of 
achieving sovereignty were open to 
question: “Independence is not nego-
tiable, because it is a right” (ran, 11 
Nov 1996). The Parti de Libération 
Kanak (palika), which broke from the 
uc during the 1995 elections, affirmed 
at its congress that the flnks needed to 
speak with one voice. Raphael Mapou 
said the 1998 vote was essential to 
win, so that the project of indepen-
dence would begin the very next day.
The ustke sees itself as the socio-
economic vanguard of a self-governing 
Kanaky, and in cooperation with the 
flnks it has been stepping up the pres-sure on France. The ustke wants local 
control over natural resources and has 
protested annually against unlimited 
immigration, which threatens the local 
inhabitants’ jobs. In May, the flnks 
government in the Northern Province 
announced that Falconbridge, a Cana-
dian firm, would help the Société 
Minérale Sud Pacifique (smsp, pur-
chased, ironically, from Lafleur in 
1990) develop a new nickel-process-
ing plant by 2002. This pact was quite 
a coup, considering the general eco-
nomic slowdown that has resulted 
from investor trepidations over the ter-
ritory’s uncertain future. But the 
Société le Nickel (sln, majority owned 
by the French state), refused to allow 
the smsp access to the Tiébaghi ore 
vein on northwest Grande Terre (the 
main island). Consequently, in late 
October the ustke and flnks together 
called a twenty-four-hour strike that 
shut down 14 of the territory’s 17 
mines. The flnks declared the block-
age a part of its overall negotiating 
process with France.
What emerged was a clash of 
visions over the future geography of 
development. The flnks plan would 
develop not only a mine at Tiébaghi 
but also at nearby Koumac a port, air-
port, and urban center to offset the 
concentration of population and eco-
nomic activity around Noumea in the 
south. Paul Néaoutyine, former presi-
dent of the flnks and chief negotiator 
for the Northern Province, described 
the plans for Koumac-Tiébaghi as 
carefully thought out, to redress old 
imbalances. In mid-November, the sln 
proposed a compromise, to give the 
smsp Koniambo instead, in the center-
west, in exchange for Poum, on the 
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Terre. Raphael Pidjot commented that 
economically the Koniambo site would 
have many advantages, but its center-
west location would undermine the 
flnks plan to move population and 
industry toward the northwest and 
effect a wider dispersal away from 
Noumea.
As this tug-of-war continued, Ber-
nard Lepeu of the uc revealed that the 
flnks hoped eventually to move the 
territorial capital itself out of Noumea 
to Koné-Pouembout, halfway up the 
west coast and within the borders of 
the Northern Province, thus creating 
three nodes of urban development, not 
just two (and undermining, over time, 
the political-economic power base of 
the rpcr in the South). Néaoutyine 
said the sln offer had its appeal, 
because Koniambo is right next to 
Koné-Pouembout, where a costly new 
cross-island road to the northeast coast 
is being built, but the flnks still pre-
ferred to purchase Tiébaghi and 
develop Koumac. By December, how-
ever, the flnks had agreed to the 
exchange of Poum for Koniambo (ran, 
Nov–Dec 1996). All this maneuvering 
coincides with an 11 percent rise in the 
world price of nickel, due to reduced 
flows of cheap Russian ores and a 
demand for stainless steel in Asia. 
Inco, Falconbridge’s chief Canadian 
rival, and an Australian firm are also 
looking into opening new sites in New 
Caledonia, which is the third largest 
nickel exporter in the world after Rus-
sia and Canada. Both nationalists and 
loyalists hope mining development in 
the North will create more jobs, even 
though the local high grade ore also 
contains asbestos, which has caused lung cancer among employees (PIM, 
Nov 1996, 23–24). In December, elec-
tions were also held for a revived 
Chamber of Agriculture, which will 
promote exports to France.
Because of its mining industry, New 
Caledonia is one of the most indus-
trialized countries in the South Pacific, 
and the ustke network of twelve labor 
federations keeps growing in power. Its 
economic activism lends significant 
clout to flnks demands for self-gov-
ernment and local development. For 
example, it shut down the docks for 
two weeks in July (after already strik-
ing for four days in January) and 
voiced opposition to selling nickel to 
foreign interests. It also bolstered the 
October mine shutdown with a general 
strike. The ustke has never avoided 
confrontation with authorities or with 
political opponents. In August, its 
blockade of provincial government 
offices on Lifou led to a violent clash 
with anti-flnks attackers wielding 
axes and iron bars, in which seven 
people were injured. In September, 
police arrested ustke pickets for 
blocking access to a Ballande store. 
The next month, the union won its 
case in court by having five employees 
reinstated, though Ballande managed 
to render that decision moot by dele-
gitimizing the tribunal. Riot police also 
clashed with ustke protesters at the 
Tomo nickel mine; three people were 
injured and those arrested were 
charged with “armed” interference 
with police. In December, the ustke 
attempted to open a new shipping line 
from Noumea to Port Vila in Vanuatu 
via the Loyalty Islands.
Leroux has said that France needs 
to acknowledge “the colonial act” and 
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local economic monopolism of Lafleur 
and his rpcr allies. His party voiced 
support for increasing devolution of 
powers to local authorities, and has 
received some support from the flnks 
to be included in negotiations with 
France. In September, Berger Kawa’s 
National Council for the Rights of 
Indigenous People commemorated at 
Bourail the French colonial takeover of 
1853 and reiterated the linkage 
between the recovery of Kanak lands 
and national independence. Recent 
public trials of French and Caldoche 
(local European) officials for financial 
corruption have tended to undermine 
accusations by loyalists that a sover-
eign Kanak-run regime would only 
replicate the “stealing” that reportedly 
goes on in some other Oceanian coun-
tries. Moreover, massive French aid 
and the inflated “hardship” salaries 
paid to metropolitan officials (from 
Paris) contribute to a very high cost of 
living in Noumea.
A vote on full sovereignty would be 
unlikely to attract a majority at the 
moment. Nekiriai has estimated that 
only 37 percent of New Caledonians 
(ie, 80 percent of Kanak) favor com-
plete independence. But Kanak, now 
only 45 percent of the total popula-
tion, are expected to become a demo-
graphic majority in about twenty years 
(MD, Feb 1996, 7). On 28 December,
in a vote on the budget of the Territo-
rial Congress, the flnks and rpcr 
agreed on “sovereignty shared with 
France,” a process of change to begin 
in 1998 that, in the words of the 
rpcr’s Pierre Frogier, will affirm the 
special identity of New Caledonia 
while respecting the “proper compe-tencies” of the (French) state. Frogier 
emphasized the “stability” that would 
result from such a course, that is, a 
potential boom in outside investment. 
The struggle for “Kanaky,” as opposed 
to quasi-colonial dependency on 
France, continues, as the team of 
flnks-ustke bargains aggressively to 
win concessions from both Paris and 
the rpcr about steps toward sover-
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Papua New Guinea
This was a frustrating year for Prime 
Minister Sir Julius Chan, who hoped 
to make progress in some key areas 
and boost his standing in the run-up to 
the 1997 general elections. Develop-
ments in the mining and oil sectors 
kept the economy buoyant, but the 
government continued to struggle with 
the World Bank over policy reform 
issues. Tragically, Chan’s hopes for a 
timely resolution of the Bougainville 
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situation there took a definite turn for 
the worse in 1996, prolonging the suf-
fering of the people and exacerbating 
already strained relations with Austra-
lia and, especially, Solomon Islands. By 
the end of the year, with his parliamen-
tary coalition in some disarray, Chan’s 
chances of a further term in office 
looked slim.
When he came to office in 1994, 
Chan, like all recent prime ministers, 
was determined to do something about 
the so-called law-and-order situation. 
However, the “year of law enforce-
ment” got off to an inauspicious start 
in mid-January when a conflict 
between a group of people from the 
Eastern Highlands and residents of the 
Waterise area in the Markham Valley 
erupted into violence. The Waterise 
group blocked the nearby Highlands 
Highway to protest the incident and, 
after a Waterise youth died of gunshot 
wounds, demanded 200,000 kina in 
compensation. Two weeks later, frus-
trated by the lack of progress in 
attempts to negotiate a settlement, and 
following a skirmish with police 
attempting to clear the highway, the 
Waterise villagers used World War II 
munitions to blow up the Yuang Creek 
Bridge.
The local police were particularly 
upset by the burning of a police vehicle 
and the loss of six firearms during the 
confrontation prior to the explosion. 
When reinforcements arrived from 
Goroka, the police rampaged through 
Waterise and surrounding villages, 
shooting, looting, and burning down 
houses. Local leaders, including 
Markham MP and Forest Minister 
Andrew Baing, Lae MP Bart Philemon, and Morobe Governor Jerry Nalau, 
converged on the scene, only to be 
turned back, threatened, or assaulted 
by the police. Governor Nalau later 
admitted in parliament that he had 
advised the people to maintain their 
roadblock, but strenuously denied 
allegations that he had told them to 
blow up the bridge (PC, 19 Feb 1996, 
13–15).
In May, the shooting deaths of 
senior public servant and one-time 
director of the Institute for Applied 
Social and Economic Research (now 
the National Research Institute) 
Ephraim Makis and his brother Albert 
Uming in Port Moresby led to renewed 
calls for a crackdown on crime (PC, 6 
May 1996, 1). After a particularly 
intense wave of murders and armed 
robberies in Port Moresby in October, 
cabinet approved the imposition of a 
two-month nationwide nighttime cur-
few, which went into effect on 8 
November. The curfew was part of a 
series of measures designed to 
strengthen police “firepower” and help 
them target “hard-core criminals” (TN, 
6 Nov 1996, 1). Observers of previous 
efforts to get tough on crime argued 
that the effect of these measures would 
only be temporary, and the National 
newspaper went as far as to suggest 
that the curfew would be “a bigger 
inconvenience to the public than the 
criminals” (TN, 7 Nov 1996, 4).
As the government focused on 
“raskol” gang activity, some of its crit-
ics urged more attention to corruption, 
another important aspect of the “crime 
nightmare.” Although many in the pri-
vate sector are clearly concerned about 
official corruption, few have been will-
ing to say so publicly. In May 1996, 
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media exposure when Oil Search 
Chairman Trevor Kennedy, whose 
company is a major operator in the 
crucial oil industry, told shareholders 
that he was concerned about growing 
levels of corruption and argued that 
the “biggest threat to the future” was 
the government’s “lack of focus and 
discipline” (PC, 9 May 1996, 11). Pre-
dictably, the speech drew an angry 
response from government leaders. 
Chan issued a lengthy statement that 
called Kennedy a “peanut boy,” 
accused him of being ill-informed, 
paternalistic, and expendable, and 
invited him to resign (PC, 13 May 
1996, 17).
Meanwhile the Ombudsman Com-
mission continued its lonely struggle 
against official wrongdoing, and lead-
ership tribunals successfully pursued 
some high-profile cases. Three former 
cabinet ministers, Timothy Bonga, 
John Nilkare, and Paul Pora, were 
found guilty of multiple counts of mis-
conduct in office, and in October a 
leadership tribunal was set up to hear 
charges against Foreign Affairs and 
Trade Secretary Gabriel Dusava. All 
protested their innocence except 
Nilkare, who admitted that some of 
his past actions might have “gone off 
the mark” (PC, 2 July 1996, 5). Bonga 
in particular appeared unrepentant, 
arguing that he was “just unfortunate 
to be one of the few that have been 
prosecuted while the others have 
walked free” (PC, 1 May 1996, 1).
The extraordinary standoff that 
began in 1995 between the govern-
ment and the World Bank continued 
throughout the year (see Wesley-Smith 
1996). In return for a us$358 million package of emergency funding, the 
World Bank had insisted on the reform 
of a long list of government policies. 
Some $200 million in aid and loans 
was released in 1995, but the balance 
was withheld pending evidence that 
the reforms had been implemented. 
Government officials were clearly irri-
tated by critical public comments made 
by Marianne Haug, the World Bank’s 
regional director, shortly before a 
World Bank team arrived for talks in 
Papua New Guinea in February (PC, 20 
Feb 1996, 11). The talks quickly 
became mired in “personality differ-
ences,” and the World Bank team was 
asked to leave, apparently by senior 
Finance Department official Morea 
Vele. However, the talks lasted long 
enough to establish that the sides had 
very different views regarding progress 
on the issues. Before departing the 
country, team leader Pirouz Hama-
dian-Rad expressed “major concern” 
regarding the government’s “commit-
ment or ability to implement its reform 
program in a transparent and consis-
tent manner” (PC, 8–10 March 1996, 
1).
The World Bank made it very clear 
that it was not going to release the sec-
ond tranche of the loan, and on 17 
April served notice that the deal could 
be canceled unless all outstanding 
issues were settled within ninety days. 
Government leaders complained that 
these pressure tactics compromised 
Papua New Guinea’s sovereignty, and 
Prime Minister Chan told reporters 
that “no one is going to give me an 
ultimatum” (PC, 23 April 1996, 32). In 
fact, the cabinet had already bowed to 
the inevitable at its meeting of 11 
March by endorsing a policy package 
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concerns. Among other things, the cab-
inet endorsed a system to ensure that 
major investment projects, such as oil 
refineries and fish canneries, would 
not violate the free market principles 
of the structural adjustment program, 
and took steps to limit the amount of 
tariff protection afforded to the 
Korean-owned Halla cement factory 
(PC, 14 March 1996, 3). By mid-May, 
the parties appeared to agree that all 
the necessary policy decisions were in 
place, but that the process of imple-
mentation remained unsatisfactory (PC, 
20 May 1996, 11). As Deputy Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister Chris 
Haiveta put it, “Cabinet can go ahead 
and make all these decisions but if the 
[government] agencies do not imple-
ment them, then we have a big prob-
lem” (PC, 1 May 1996, 3).
However, government policy deci-
sions were to precipitate further show-
downs with the bank later in the year. 
The bank had placed considerable 
importance on reforms in the troubled 
forestry industry, which received a 
boost in March when the cabinet 
endorsed the so-called Logging Code 
of Conduct, undertook to fast-track 
the implementation of a new logging 
tax and royalty system, and promised 
that amendments to the Forestry Act 
would be limited to “technical mat-
ters” (PC, 14 March 1996, 3). The 
amendment issue was crucial, because 
Forest Minister Andrew Baing was 
actively seeking to change the act in 
ways that critics claimed would 
enhance his own powers and under-
mine the independence of the National 
Forest Authority Board (PC, 19 Feb 
1996, 5).Matters came to a head in July 
when parliament passed amendments 
to the Forestry Act altering the respec-
tive roles of the Minister for Forests 
and the Forestry Authority Board. The 
bank claimed these were not the 
changes they had endorsed on a recent 
visit, and indicated they would have to 
be reversed for the loan to be approved 
(PC, 30 July 1996, 1). For a while, gov-
ernment leaders adopted a defiant pos-
ture, with Chan claiming to have 
alternative sources of finance and say-
ing he was ready to tell the bank to 
“go to hell” (PC, 2 Aug 1996, 3; 5 Sept 
1996, 2). Relations deteriorated even 
further in September, when the World 
Bank’s Pirouz Hamidian-Rad joined a 
chorus of protest at the government’s 
revenue budget. He was especially crit-
ical of proposed new import duties on 
rice and fuel oil, and the reintroduc-
tion of certain price controls. The gov-
ernment’s decision to hand down such 
a budget, he said, “clearly indicated it 
was no longer interested in continuing 
the structural adjustment program” 
(PC, 27–29 Sept 1996, 1).
In the first of a remarkable series of 
reversals, the government abandoned 
or modified the controversial revenue 
measures less than a week after they 
were announced. Finance Minister 
Haiveta immediately traveled to New 
York to reopen talks with the World 
Bank before their latest deadline 
expired. In a faxed letter to Prime Min-
ister Chan, Haiveta outlined five con-
ditions to be satisfied before the loan 
would be released, the most important 
of which was to reinstate the indepen-
dence and integrity of the National 
Forestry Board through further 
amendments to the Forestry Act. He 
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image and credibility” would be dam-
aged if the agreement with the World 
Bank were allowed to lapse, jeopardiz-
ing other external aid and financing 
arrangements, and adversely affecting 
the forthcoming public float of Oro-
gen, a company set up to manage some 
of the state’s mineral and petroleum 
assets (PC, 4 Oct 1996, 1, 5). Chan and 
his cabinet reluctantly agreed that 
these were compelling reasons for 
compliance, and on 8 October parlia-
ment passed the Forestry (Amend-
ment) Bill 1996 (PC, 9 Oct 1996, 1). 
This removed the major obstacle to 
settlement, although it took several 
more months to satisfy a number of 
other conditions. The second tranche 
of the loan was finally released early in 
1997.
The blaze of publicity surrounding 
the lengthy struggle with the World 
Bank apparently did not affect public 
confidence in the future of Papua New 
Guinea’s lucrative mining and oil sec-
tors. In September, some 49 percent of 
the state’s stake in large mining and oil 
projects was transferred from the Min-
eral Resources Development Com-
pany to a new company, Orogen 
Minerals Limited. Shares in Orogen, 
named after the geological process that 
produced the country’s mineral wealth, 
were first offered to residents of Papua 
New Guinea at a discounted price 
before overseas bids were invited. The 
float, which closed at the end of Octo-
ber, was heavily oversubscribed, 
attracting worldwide offers totaling 
2.6 billion kina for approximately 270 
million kina worth of shares (PC, 31 
Oct 1996, 1). The highly successful 
Orogen float prompted the govern-ment to move ahead with its plans to 
privatize more state assets, and to 
announce at the end of October “the 
complete (or near complete) and early” 
sale of its equity in financial institu-
tions, including the Papua New 
Guinea Banking Corporation and 
Niugini Insurance Corporation (PC, 31 
Oct 1996, 27).
Orogen investor confidence was, no 
doubt, boosted by some positive devel-
opments in the mineral and oil sectors 
during 1996. The smooth progress of 
the giant Lihir gold project toward a 
1997 startup date was certainly 
encouraging, especially given its trou-
bled early history. The oil industry also 
looked set to continue its expansion, 
with the Gobe field heading for pro-
duction, and a promising new find by 
Chevron Niugini at its Moran IX drill 
site in the Southern Highlands, within 
range of the Kutubu project’s process-
ing and exporting facilities. However, 
the extractive industries continued to 
be plagued by disputes. The govern-
ment continued to resist landowners’ 
demands to control a bigger stake in 
the Kutubu project and the right to 
market their share of production (PC, 8 
Jan 1996, 13; 16 Jan 1996, 11; 6 Feb 
1996, 21).
Meanwhile, the key player in Papua 
New Guinea’s oil industry expressed 
frustration at delays at the Gobe 
project. Speaking to a petroleum con-
vention in Port Moresby in September, 
Oil Search Managing Director Peter 
Botten noted that agreement with 
landowners had yet to be reached. “It 
appears to me,” he said, “that the pri-
mary risk of development in Papua 
New Guinea is not the vagaries of 
nature but the failure to manage 
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in the project area” (PC, 10 Sept 1996, 
23).
The people living on the Ok Tedi 
and Fly rivers downstream of the Ok 
Tedi copper and gold mine had some 
of their expectations met during 1996. 
In 1994, landowners had brought an 
a$4 billion legal claim in Australia 
against mine operator Broken Hill Pro-
prietary (bhp) for damage caused by 
the discharge of large quantities of 
untreated tailings from the project into 
the river system. In 1995, bhp and the 
Papua New Guinea government tried 
to defuse the challenge by providing 
compensation for affected villagers 
under the terms of the Ok Tedi 
Restated Eighth Supplemental Agree-
ment. The first payments were distrib-
uted in April 1996, shortly after a law 
was enacted prohibiting the pursuit of 
Papua New Guinea–based compensa-
tion claims in foreign courts (PC, 15 
April 1996, 2; 23 April 1996, 3). Then 
in June, before the government had an 
opportunity to exercise its new legal 
powers, the case against bhp was set-
tled out of court. In a major victory, 
the landowners received a$110 million 
in compensation and the promise of a 
tailings disposal system, while their 
Melbourne law firm, Slater and Gor-
don, was awarded a$7.6 million in 
legal fees. By the end of the year the 
mining company was considering vari-
ous options to deal with the tailings 
disposal problem. Meanwhile, govern-
ment officials were, no doubt, moni-
toring the cost of the various options, 
and wondering when, if ever, the ten-
year-old, multibillion-dollar project 
would yield substantial revenues for 
the state (PC, 26 Sept 1996, 27).Settlement of the Bougainville seces-
sionist crisis remained elusive in 1996. 
The All Bougainville Leaders’ Talks in 
Cairns in December 1995 had initiated 
a dialogue that looked promising 
between the various factions in Bou-
gainville. However, the mood of 
optimism began to dissipate almost 
immediately, when Bougainville Revo-
lutionary Army (bra) and Bougainville 
Interim Government (big) leaders were 
attacked by Papua New Guinea secu-
rity forces as they returned to Bougain-
ville by sea from the Solomon Islands 
after the Cairns talks. Prime Minister 
Chan denied big leader Joseph Kabui’s 
charge that this was a deliberate assas-
sination attempt, claiming that because 
the group was supposed to travel by 
helicopter the military unit involved 
had been caught unawares (PC, 11 Jan 
1996, 2).
The situation deteriorated rapidly in 
March after a firefight between secu-
rity forces in boats and a bra contin-
gent on Motsungan Island off the west 
coast of Buka left six police and sol-
diers dead (PC, 13 March 1996, 1; 18 
March 1996, 1). Five days later the 
bra group, led by Ishmael Toroana, 
ambushed and killed four more police-
men on Buka (PC, 19 March 1996, 1). 
The Buka incidents were, it seems, the 
final straw for Prime Minister Chan, 
who had become increasingly disen-
chanted with the peace efforts initiated 
since 1994 by Bougainville Transi-
tional Government Premier Theodore 
Miriung. On 21 March he called off 
the two-year-old cease-fire and sig-
naled a return to the military option. 
“I am now convinced,” he told the 
nation, “that we have exhausted all 
human tolerance. . . . There is not one 
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the rebels are sincere.” He warned the 
“criminals who continue to kill, destroy 
and destabilize the peace longed for by 
all” that their “darkest hour has 
arrived” (PC, 22 March 1996, 8).
The new military offensive, which 
came in June, made matters worse. 
Operation High Speed II involved two 
battalions of troops, one of which had 
recently arrived on rotation, backed up 
by police and resistance fighters. The 
plan was to seal the border with the 
Solomons and advance on rebel 
strongholds in the interior from points 
on the east and west coasts of the 
island (SMH, 19 June 1996, 1). Troops 
were deployed into bra-held areas, 
and on several occasions exchanged 
fire with rebel groups. These 
exchanges claimed the lives of four sol-
diers, bra commander Nathan Mat-
evai, and an unknown number of 
others (PC, 2 Aug 1996, 4). However, 
the stated objective of “wiping out” 
the bra was not achieved, and the 
operation ended quietly on 15 July, 
when the 520 troops who should have 
been relieved in June were withdrawn 
to the Papua New Guinea mainland 
(PC, 14 Aug 1996, 2).
A further blow to military morale 
was delivered less than two months 
after the ignominy of High Speed II. 
On 8 September an attack at Kangu 
Beach on the south coast of Bougain-
ville killed twelve members of the secu-
rity forces, their largest loss in a single 
incident since the crisis began in 1988, 
and a further five were taken hostage. 
The attack was originally blamed on 
the bra, but reports that government-
trained “resistance” fighters were 
involved soon began to surface (PC, 20–22 Sept 1996, 1). An internal 
investigation by the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force later found that 
the attack had been initiated by resis-
tance fighters angry at the drunken 
conduct of the soldiers and their ill-
treatment of local people and residents 
of the Kangu Beach care center. Resis-
tance leaders had solicited the help of 
the bra, who joined in the killing and 
escaped with ammunition and more 
than thirty military weapons. The 
report held the commanding officer of 
the company stationed at Kangu Beach 
responsible for the breakdown in disci-
pline that led to the massacre (PC, 25–
27 Oct 1996, 1; 21 Jan 1997, 1). The 
five hostages were still in captivity at 
the end of the year, despite concerted 
attempts by Premier Theodore Miri-
ung, senior local MP John Momis, and 
Sir Michael Somare, the country’s first 
prime minister, to secure their release.
The Kangu Beach incident also 
revealed the depth of the distrust that 
had developed between Bougainville 
Transitional Government Premier 
Theodoe Miriung and members of the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force. 
Along with many others, Miriung had 
roundly condemned High Speed II and 
predicted its failure. Long suspicious 
of his pre-1994 connections with the 
bra, the military responded by restrict-
ing his movements on several occa-
sions. In September, Defence Minister 
Mathias Ijape, citing military intelli-
gence, openly accused Miriung of incit-
ing the Kangu Beach attack. Although 
Miriung categorically denied the 
charge, he was temporarily placed 
under house arrest in Buka (PC, 11 Sept 
1996, 1).
In a tragic setback for the peace 
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Miriung was shot dead on 12 October 
1996 in his wife’s village in the Siwai 
area of southwest Bougainville. The 
assassination sent shock waves 
throughout the nation and overseas. 
Anguished regional MP John Momis 
said that Miriung was “without doubt 
one of Bougainville’s all-time great 
leaders” whose death had “taken a 
large part of me with him.” He said 
the death marked the passing of an era 
“of dialogue, reconciliation, and great 
hopes for peace on Bougainville” and 
demanded to know “Who shot him, 
and why?” (PC, 17 Oct 1996, 12). 
Although Prime Minister Chan had 
clearly lost his initial enthusiasm for 
Miriung’s peacemaking efforts, he 
described the killing as an act of mad-
ness and vowed to bring the perpetra-
tors to justice (TN, 13 Oct 1996, 1). He 
appointed a Sri Lankan judge recom-
mended by the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat in London to head the official 
inquiry.
In early December, Judge Thiruvuk-
karasu Suntheralingam presented his 
report, which found that five defense 
force soldiers and several resistance 
fighters stationed at Tonu Camp had 
participated in the murder of Theodore 
Miriung (TN, 2 Dec 1996, 1). Defense 
force leaders claimed the investigation 
was biased, but the full report, which 
was not made public until early 1997, 
left little doubt about the complicity of 
defense force personnel. The report did 
not say who ordered the attack or who 
in the military chain of command had 
knowledge of it, nor did it tackle the 
question of motive. Nevertheless, the 
report served to damage even further 
public confidence in the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, already reeling 
from the failure of Operation High 
Speed II and the Kangu Beach fiasco.
Solomon Islands was in the fore-
front of protests about the handling of 
the Bougainville crisis by Papua New 
Guinea authorities, especially the secu-
rity forces. For some years, Papua New 
Guinea authorities have tried to block 
the traffic of people and supplies 
between Bougainville and Solomon 
Islands, and have sought Solomon 
Islands’ full cooperation in doing so. 
However, the Solomons leaders have 
argued that they don’t have sufficient 
resources to patrol the border area, 
and have refused to allow Papua New 
Guinea hot-pursuit rights across the 
border. Although there have been 
numerous border violations in recent 
years, such incursions became more 
blatant in 1996. Especially after the 
lifting of the cease-fire early in the 
year, the Papua New Guinea forces 
seemed to consider themselves free to 
cross into Solomon Islands in hot pur-
suit of suspected bra fighters or to dis-
rupt suspected bases or supply lines. In 
March, Defence Minister Mathias 
Ijape warned Solomon Islands that “if 
criminals cross the border and want to 
get refuge in Solomon Islands, the 
pngdf will cross their border in hot 
pursuit and deal with those criminals 
on Solomon Islands soil” (PC, 27 
March 1996, 2).
Solomon Islands protested eighteen 
border violations in April and May 
alone, some of which involved fire-
fights with Solomon Islands police or 
members of the Field Force. In June a 
patrol boat reportedly fired on the vil-
lage of Liuliu in Choiseul Province, 
and suspected bra fighters were killed 
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New Guinea helicopter later the same 
month. In late June a series of incidents 
occurred at the Solomon Islands post 
at Tuluve, and in early July a Papua 
New Guinea patrol boat bombarded 
the Field Force observation post at 
Ovau on several occasions (May 1996, 
12–14; PC, 15 July 1996, 11). Such 
incidents gave ongoing diplomatic 
talks added urgency, and in July both 
countries agreed to accelerate work on 
a series of border treaties and to estab-
lish a Joint Border Commission to 
coordinate and oversee border man-
agement issues (PC, 8 July 1996, 5).
Things did not look good for Prime 
Minister Chan as 1996 drew to a 
close. In particular, he had taken on 
the mighty World Bank and lost, while 
failing to bring about a settlement of 
the Bougainville crisis, which had 
occupied much of his attention since 
coming to office in 1994. He had, 
however, managed to keep his govern-
ing coalition together and maintain his 
majority in parliament, despite some 
significant conflicts between members 
of his People’s Progress Party and its 
major coalition partner Pangu Pati 
over cabinet appointments and minis-
terial responsibilities (PC, 31 July 1996, 
2; 6–8 Sept 1996, 1). There were also 
problems within Pangu Pati. In Octo-
ber, an unsuccessful move to oust 
Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta 
as leader of Pangu was apparently 
sparked by Haiveta’s controversial rev-
enue budget (PC, 7 Oct 1996, 1). The 
party also finally broke its ties with 
founding member Sir Michael Somare, 
who had announced plans to set up a 
new political group, the National Alli-
ance, to contest the national election and upset Chan’s aspiration to lead the 
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Solomon Islands
In 1996 politics in the Solomon Islands 
were turbulent, as usual, but by 
December the focus of political discus-
sion was on the general election, 
scheduled for July 1997. Many poten-
tial candidates began campaigning for 
an election billed to be the most inter-
esting since independence from Great 
Britain in July 1978, and coinciding 
with the nineteenth anniversary cele-
brations. The year was also character-
ized by leadership squabbles and 
political discord that left many press-
ing issues unresolved. This, however, is 
not unusual in a country where the 
political landscape is often marked by 
rapid and unpredictable changes.
In early 1996 the country was still 
trying to deal with issues inherited 
from previous years, particularly the 
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crisis of late 1994, which resulted in 
the collapse of the National Coalition 
Party (ncp) government led by Francis 
Billy Hilly. The most dramatic aspect 
of this event was the allegation that 
five cabinet ministers of the ncp gov-
ernment had defected to join Solomon 
Mamaloni’s Solomon Islands National 
Unity and Reconciliation Party 
(sinurp) after receiving bribes from 
Robert Goh, a Honiara businessman 
and director of Goh and Partners Pub-
lic Accountants. Deprived of his 
majority, Billy Hilly was forced by 
Governor General Sir Moses Pitakaka 
to resign as prime minister in October 
1994. Mamaloni was immediately 
elected prime minister and formed the 
sinurp government.
The five defectors were later 
charged with corruption and appeared 
before the Magistrate’s Court for a 
preliminary hearing in January 1996. 
During the court hearing Robert Goh 
admitted that he had paid for hired 
cars and accommodation for the five 
who had by then become cabinet min-
isters in the sinurp government: Alfred 
Maetia (Education), John Musuota 
(Posts and Telecommunications), 
Edmund Anderson (Agriculture and 
Fisheries), Francis Orodani (Lands and 
Housing), and Oliver Zapo (Justice) 
(SS, 19 Jan 1996). Although the case 
was committed to the High Court, 
these men retained their ministerial 
portfolios for most of the year. In late 
August, Orodani and Musuota were 
fired by the prime minister along with 
two other cabinet ministers, although 
it was unclear whether this was related 
to the corruption saga. Orodani was 
acquitted in November, but the office of the director of public prosecutions 
planned to appeal the ruling.
This was not the only corruption 
story of 1996. Allegations of corrup-
tion emerged from nearly every sector 
of public life, involving many who 
occupy responsible positions in politics 
and the public service. By midyear 
many citizens were concerned that cor-
ruption would become part of the 
public sector culture, and there was 
widespread distrust of politicians and 
public servants. Finance Minister 
Christopher Columbus Abe stated in 
February that fraudulent appropria-
tion of government payments was not 
confined to the Treasury Division of 
his ministry, but widespread through-
out the government system. Abe was 
reacting to new measures imposed by 
Accountant General Michael Katea to 
curb embezzlement and other fraudu-
lent payments from the government 
treasury (SC, 22 Feb 1996).
The most dramatic manifestation of 
official corruption was uncovered in 
April and May when Prime Minister 
Mamaloni (as acting finance minister) 
ordered the suspension of thirty-five 
public servants on half pay for alleg-
edly misappropriating si$10 million of 
government funds (SS, 8 May 1996). 
Since then, the amount of allegedly 
misappropriated government money 
has increased to si$35 million. This 
revelation shocked and angered the 
country. The prime minister then 
ordered the police to confiscate the 
property of the thirty-five public ser-
vants. For Mamaloni, this was a spec-
tacular move to salvage his political 
reputation, which had nose-dived since 
he came to power in late 1994 because 
of controversies over the logging 
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five of his cabinet ministers, and the 
continuous deterioration of the coun-
try’s economy. Despite huge publicity, 
however, none of the public servants 
involved had been officially charged by 
the end of 1996. This left many people 
wondering whether the case was 
merely a public relations ploy aimed at 
improving the reputation of the sinurp 
government, and more particularly 
Mamaloni, in preparation for the 1997 
general elections.
Central Islands Province Premier 
Peter Manetiva and his deputy, Charles 
Sagulinge, also faced corruption 
charges during the year. In February 
the Magistrate’s Court in Honiara 
heard allegations that they had been 
induced by hotel accommodation and 
cash to grant a business license to a 
company called Marving Brothers, 
allowing it to log on Pavuvu in the 
Russell Islands. The payments were 
allegedly made by Goh and Partners 
Public Accountants and Allan 
Kemakeza, the member of parliament 
for Savo and Russells and minister for 
environment and conservation (SS, 23 
Feb 1996). The Pavuvu issue became 
controversial after landowners began 
resisting government proposals to log 
the island in 1995.
While corruption charges against 
people in power were being debated in 
the media, tried in the courts, and 
whispered in the galleries of public life, 
the economy continued to receive a 
battering. The most obvious indication 
of the deteriorating economic situation 
was the rapidly increasing cost of liv-
ing. The Central Bank of Solomon 
Islands reported that the rate of infla-
tion increased from 10.4 percent at the end of December 1995, to a peak of 
14.5 percent at the end of March 1996 
(cbsi, April 1996). By the third quarter 
the rate of inflation had dropped back 
to 10.4 percent, although this was still 
1.9 per cent higher than the rate for 
the same quarter of the previous year. 
The Central Bank noted that “by 
regional and international standards 
the current rate of inflation is high in 
Solomon Islands, although from a his-
torical perspective inflation has always 
been high” (cbsi, Sept 1995, 20). 
Average urban workers living on mini-
mal salaries were the hardest hit by the 
high inflation rate.
It was a difficult year in nearly every 
sector of the economy. Government 
debt increased both domestically and 
internationally. Many citizens were 
astounded when the Honiara news-
paper Solomon Star reported in
March that the government owed the 
National Provident Fund (the coun-
try’s only national superannuation 
scheme) a total of si$20 million in 
rents ($917,473), loans ($5,676,015), 
contributions ($10 million), securities 
($1,915,370), and surcharges 
($1,096,000) (ss, 15 March 1996). 
The country’s three commercial banks 
were also affected by the government’s 
inability to pay bank securities. 
According to the Central Bank, the 
government had accrued over $8 mil-
lion of debts to the banks since the 
start of 1995. The general manager of 
the National Bank of Solomon Islands 
stated that the “loss of reliable income 
hits straight at our ability to grow and 
expand” (SS, 1 May 1996).
The country continued to accumu-
late debts with international lending 
agencies such as the World Bank, the 
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Asian Development Bank. By the end 
of the year the government was operat-
ing on a huge budget deficit that had 
been inherited from previous years. In 
1995, Finance Minister Abe told par-
liament of his difficulties financing a 
“huge” budget deficit: “The govern-
ment debt is rocketing upwards and 
now accounts for some 70 percent of 
our gross domestic products. This 
means that the government has 
incurred a debt of about $1,750 for 
every single person here in the isles of 
Solomons” (sinp 1995).
Despite the grim fiscal picture, the 
story was a little more positive on the 
macroeconomic level by the third 
quarter of 1996. The balance of pay-
ments showed a trade surplus of si$30 
million, 19 percent higher than the 
previous quarter and 15 percent higher 
than the same quarter of the previous 
year. The value of total exports also 
increased by 15 percent to si$168 mil-
lion in the quarter ending 30 Septem-
ber, compared with a decline of 7 
percent in the previous quarter. Total 
exports for the nine months through 
September reached si$471 million, 21 
percent higher than for the same 
period a year before. This allowed 
external reserves to grow to si$102 
million by September, the equivalent of 
around 1.6 months of import cover. 
However, taking into account the gov-
ernment’s external arrears of around 
si$17 million, the reserves represent 
only 1.3 months of import cover (cbsi, 
Sept 1996).
Government revenues also 
improved during the nine months to 
September. The total revenues were 
si$263 million, which was up by 13 percent on the same period a year ear-
lier. This represented about 78 percent 
of total expected revenues for the 
whole year, as recorded in the 1996 
budget estimates. This means that the 
overall government revenue perfor-
mance in 1996 will be broadly in line 
with the budget outcome. However, 
the Central Bank argues that “revenues 
could have been higher by around 
si$11.8 million had the government 
proceeded to suspend all duty exemp-
tions and remissions to logging com-
panies” (cbsi, Sept 1996, 23). “Local” 
logging companies in particular have 
been given 100 percent export tax 
exemption, even though most of them 
have overseas partners. For example, 
Prime Minister Mamaloni’s logging 
company, Somma Limited, works in 
partnership with the Goodwill Com-
pany of Malaysia.
These improvements in the 
economy were, unfortunately, over-
shadowed by the government’s huge 
domestic and international debts. The 
government’s borrowing had exceeded 
its ability to repay. In a desperate 
attempt to salvage the country’s crip-
pled economy, parliament passed a 
controversial bill in December 1995 
that, if implemented, would impose a 2 
percent tax on every withdrawal from 
bank savings. In February 1996, 
Finance Minister Abe announced that 
despite widespread criticism of the 
proposed tax, it would be effected in 
June. The decision outraged the public 
as well as the banks. However, the fate 
of the proposed debit tax was deter-
mined when, in May, Abe fell ill in 
Singapore and had to spend some 
weeks receiving medical treatment in 
Australia. During his absence, Prime 
political reviews • melanesia 491Minister Mamaloni, a veteran political 
genius, took the opportunity to mend 
his and his government’s public image. 
In a tactical public relations campaign, 
Mamaloni made himself acting finance 
minister and subsequently ordered the 
debit tax bill thrown out. In addition, 
he suspended payments from the Con-
stituency Development Fund, which 
gave each member of parliament per-
sonal control over si$200,000 per 
year. However, the decision to suspend 
the fund was reversed in July, when 
Abe returned as finance minister.
The government’s biggest economic 
achievement was finalizing agree-
ments for a gold-mining project on 
Guadalcanal. The economic situation 
is expected to be boosted when the 
Gold Ridge gold mine begins opera-
tion in June 1997. The agreements for 
mining were finalized in a series of 
documents signed in 1996 between 
Ross Mining of Australia, the govern-
ment, and the Gold Ridge Landowners 
Association, which represents the 
landowning tribes in the area. This is 
Solomon Islands’ first large-scale min-
ing project, although alluvial gold has 
been mined at Gold Ridge since the 
1970s. Throughout the year the gov-
ernment’s immediate concern was to 
ensure the Gold Ridge project got 
started as soon as possible. This is not 
surprising given that the Gold Ridge 
deposit contains an estimated si$1 
billion worth of gold. The company 
expected to complete the feasibility 
studies by July 1996 and be ready to 
go ahead with the project (SS, 7 Feb 
1996).
However, like most projects, there 
were a number of costs. As part of the 
agreement the more than seven hun-dred residents of Gold Ridge in central 
Guadalcanal will be relocated to 
Lungga (near Henderson Airport) in 
order to make way for the mining 
operation. This is planned to be a tem-
porary relocation. After the mining is 
completed, in about ten years, the 
environment in the Gold Ridge area 
will be rejuvenated and the residents 
returned to their homes (SS, 31 Jan 
1996). A general social impact assess-
ment was prepared, but, despite its 
profound social implications, the 
relocation plan was not studied spe-
cifically.
The estimated si$6 million cost of 
the resettlement scheme will be met by 
the Ross Mining Company. It involves 
the construction of residential houses, 
schools, and a clinic and is expected to 
provide more than a hundred direct 
jobs over a period of about twenty 
weeks. A ground-breaking ceremony 
was held in November to mark the 
beginning of construction work on 
Gold Ridge resettlement village (SS, 13 
Nov 1996). The company had paid 
si$90,000 in access fees to landowners 
earlier in the year and estimated that 
the capital development cost will be 
about si$125 million (SS, 31 Jan 1996).
Events in 1996 were dominated by 
another long-standing resource-extrac-
tion issue. The government continued 
its controversial policies in the forestry 
industry, despite widespread criticism 
from foreign governments as well as 
international and local nongovernment 
organizations and individuals. It was 
estimated that the forestry resource 
was being harvested at three times the 
sustainable rate, causing uproar 
among environmental groups. Also, 
there was concern over the govern-
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tion awarded to some logging 
companies, including the prime minis-
ter’s own Somma Limited, which oper-
ates in his West Makira constituency. 
These criticisms culminated in an Aus-
tralian Broadcasting Commission For-
eign Correspondent television program 
produced in August, which highlighted 
the prime minister’s involvement in the 
logging industry. The issue of logging 
was made more prominent by the Cen-
tral Bank of Solomon Islands 1995 
Annual Report, which stated that 
despite an increase in log exports, the 
revenue from log products has not 
increased. This caused many people to 
ask questions.
Forest policy in Solomon Islands is 
a political as well as an environmental 
issue. The reactions and responses of 
foreign governments as well as interna-
tional and domestic nongovernment 
organizations were also important. 
Australia’s then minister for develop-
ment cooperation and Pacific affairs, 
Gordon Bilney, for example, lashed 
out against the government’s logging 
policy. In reaction, an executive officer 
of the Solomon Islands Forest Indus-
tries Association, Erick Kes, stated that 
“it is deplorable, that the minister 
totally ignored affirmative change and 
positive developments taking place in 
this industry” (SV, 16 Feb 1996). For-
estry is an issue that will definitely fea-
ture in campaigns for the 1997 
election. It was ironic that in February 
the prime minister blamed the Forestry 
Division of the Ministry of Forest, 
Environment and Conservation for 
what it had described as the present 
untidy situation in the forestry 
industry (SS, 16 Feb 1996).The eight-year war between the 
rebel Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
(bra) and the Papua New Guinea gov-
ernment across the western border in 
Bougainville continued to affect the 
Solomon Islands. Officially the 
Solomon Islands government recog-
nizes the crisis as an internal matter for 
Papua New Guinea. However, the real-
ity is that Solomon Islands involve-
ment is inevitable. First, the number of 
Bougainvillean civilians fleeing the 
war-torn island into the Solomon 
Islands continues to increase, and 
many crossed the border in 1996 seek-
ing medical assistance, often for bullet 
wounds (SS, 11 Dec 1996).
The situation has been further exac-
erbated by the presence in Honiara 
over the last six years of bra represen-
tative Martin Miriori. However, in 
January Miriori’s house in Honiara 
(which also housed the bra office) was 
burned down. Two Bougainvilleans 
were later arrested and charged with 
arson. Fearing for his and his family’s 
safety, Miriori was eventually given 
political asylum in the Netherlands 
and in June was flown out of Honiara 
in a specially arranged Australian mili-
tary aircraft.
Continued Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force incursions into the 
Solomon Islands, and a number of 
armed confrontations with the 
Solomon Islands Police Field Force, 
drew the country further into the Bou-
gainville crisis. As Prime Minister 
Mamaloni noted in July, the crisis has 
resulted in the increasing militarization 
of the Solomon Islands economy and 
society (SS, 5 July 1996), imposing fur-
ther strains on the country’s budget. 
There is an increasing acceptance 
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military, particularly in Western and 
Choiseul Provinces, which share the 
border with Bougainville. At the dip-
lomatic level, the government has 
requested assistance from the United 
Nations to help find a solution for the 
crisis.
The Bougainville crisis continues to 
be an important agenda item affecting 
relations between the Solomon Islands 
and Papua New Guinea. When twelve 
PNG soldiers were killed on Kangu 
Beach in South Bougainville in Septem-
ber, Solomon Islanders were accused of 
supplying the arms to the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army. Solomon 
Islander students in various Papua 
New Guinea institutions were repatri-
ated after some were allegedly threat-
ened. Most were later sent back to 
Papua New Guinea after assurances 
that their security would be guaranteed 
by the PNG government, which had 
expressed disappointment over the 
repatriation decision (SS, 11 Oct 1996). 
Diplomatic relations deteriorated to 
the point that officials in the two coun-
tries refused to talk to each other. 
Prime Minister Mamaloni, in particu-
lar, refused to meet his PNG counter-
part, Sir Julius Chan. However, the 
situation improved in early 1997, 
when Chan talked with Mamaloni in 
Honiara on his way back from the 
state funeral of Marshall Islands Presi-
dent Amata Kabua. The two countries 
agreed to establish joint border surveil-
lance that would allow PNG Defence 
Force personnel “to be based on bor-
der posts in the Solomon Islands, 
allowing them to police the movement 
of Bougainville rebels between Bou-
gainville Island and the Solomons” (National, 10 Jan 1997). Sir Julius 
later told reporters in Port Moresby 
that “these talks have ensured that 
recent strains in the relationship 
caused by the crisis do not derail our 
friendly relationship” (National, 10 
Jan 1997).
Former diplomat and Foreign Min-
ister Francis Saemala was appointed as 
the government’s special envoy on the 
Bougainville crisis on 2 June 1996. His 
terms of reference included “to pursue 
a more determined effort for a con-
structive and cooperative approach to 
resolving the crisis . . . and to seek to 
establish a peace plan” (SN, June–July 
1996). However, by the end of the year 
the Bougainville crisis was far from 
being resolved, and the Solomon 
Islands perspective had not changed.
Perhaps the Mamaloni govern-
ment’s most important domestic politi-
cal landmark during the year was the 
passing of the new Provincial Govern-
ment Bill 1996, which replaced the 
Provincial Government Act 1981. This 
was a long-standing issue that had first 
been discussed in the 1980s but was 
never passed by parliament because of 
continual changes in government. This 
time it went through parliament with-
out many difficulties. The new act 
allows for a restructuring of the pro-
vincial government system with the 
objective of helping people participate 
more in the process of governance. 
Previously, the Solomon Islands had a 
three-tier system of government, with 
central and provincial governments as 
well as area councils. Each of the nine 
provincial governments had an elected 
assembly with a premier, an executive, 
and a speaker. This system was 
deemed expensive and not conducive 
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system replaces provincial govern-
ments with provincial councils consist-
ing of presidents of area assemblies, 
the only local bodies to be elected by 
the people. Consequently, there will be 
two, instead of three, elected tiers of 
government. This, it was argued, 
would improve people’s participation 
in the decision-making process (sinp 
1996).
The bill was widely accepted within 
parliament, but there were mixed reac-
tions outside parliament. Initially, 
Malaita, Western, and Guadalcanal 
Provinces opposed the bill. Although 
Malaita and Western Provinces later 
withdrew their opposition, Guadal-
canal Province argued that the imple-
mentation of the bill was unconstitu-
tional and filed a case in the High 
Court. One of the major arguments is 
that the inclusion of chiefs as unelected 
members of the Area Assemblies is 
unconstitutional because the constitu-
tion requires that leaders should be 
chosen through universal suffrage. In 
late February 1997, the High Court 
ruled in favor of Guadalcanal Province 
and declared the 1996 Provincial Gov-
ernment Act “null and void.”
Politics in the central government 
were mirrored in the provincial gov-
ernments. In two provinces there were 
changes in leadership, while in the 
others the same issues of finance, log-
ging, and the Bougainville crisis domi-
nated the political agenda. In Choiseul 
Province, which is adjacent to Bou-
gainville, Premier Clement Kengava 
was voted out in a motion of no confi-
dence. New Premier Jerold Simmy 
Vazarabatu identified the spillover 
effects of the Bougainville crisis and 
logging as his most immediate con-cerns (personal communication, July 
1996). In Guadalcanal Province, poli-
tics were much more traumatic. 
Throughout the first half of the year, 
the province’s premier, Gideon Moses, 
came under criticism for his general 
handling of provincial affairs. A num-
ber of calls for him to resign came 
from within the provincial assembly 
and from his executive. In late March a 
motion of no confidence was moved 
and passed. However, Moses refused 
to step down, arguing that the provin-
cial Speaker did not comply with the 
provincial standing order when he 
accepted the notice for the motion of 
no confidence (SS, 29 March 1996). 
Moses challenged the validity of the 
motion of no confidence in the High 
Court, which subsequently ruled in his 
favor. However, immediately after the 
High Court decision, another motion 
of no confidence was filed against him, 
and in mid-April he was ousted from 
power. Moses was replaced by Siriako 
Usa as premier. In Western Province, 
Premier Thornley Hite took the Bou-
gainville crisis as the most important 
issue, especially in view of the increas-
ing number of Bougainvilleans coming 
across the border to Gizo, the provin-
cial capital. In other provinces, finance 
held center stage in political discus-
sions.
As stated earlier, 1996 was marked 
by early preparations for the 1997 
election by individuals and political 
parties. In January, former Governor 
General Sir George Lepping publicly 
announced his intention to compete in 
the general election. Immediately he 
began organizing the Peoples Alliance 
Party. In June the party held a three-
day national convention, after which 
Sir George was elected president, 
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earlier in the year (SS, 31 Jan 1996). 
Other political parties were also pre-
paring for the 1997 general election. In 
February, president and founder of the 
Christian Democratic Front Milton 
Talasasa announced that the party was 
working toward finalizing candidates 
to contest the 1997 general election 
and planning a national convention in 
June, when it would launch its mani-
festo and announce its candidates. 
Talasasa announced that the party 
expected to field twenty candidates in 
four provinces. If this eventuates, it 
will be the first time the party has con-
tested the elections since its formation 
in 1988 (SS, 9 Feb 1996). The forma-
tion of such a party reflects the impor-
tant role churches can play in the 
country’s politics. There is already a 
Christian Fellowship party in parlia-
ment, and it is likely churches will con-
tinue to have significant influence on 
politics and the state.
Within the opposition, prepara-
tions for the 1997 election were tem-
porarily marred by political wrangling 
between the parties. In April, after 
continuous political bickering between 
the parties, Sir Baddley Devesi resigned 
as leader of the opposition. In May 
former Prime Minister Ezekiel Alebua 
was elected to replace him. Alebua’s 
first task was to call on Prime Minister 
Mamaloni to declare a state of emer-
gency at the border with Papua New 
Guinea and start dialogue with Prime 
Minister Sir Julius Chan. Alebua also 
lashed out against the government’s 
forestry policy and the management of 
the economy. But the most interesting 
development was when three of the six 
parties in the opposition (United Party, 
National Front for Progress, and Christian Fellowship) merged to form 
a new National Party and elected Ale-
bua as leader. The three parties that 
did not join the new National Party 
were the National Action Party of 
Solomon Islands led by Francis Sae-
mala, the Peoples Alliance Party led by 
Sir George Lepping, and the Labour 
Party led by Joses Tuhanuku (SS, 8 
May 1996).
The formation of this new opposi-
tion party caused an interesting twist 
in Solomon Islands politics when Fran-
cis Saemala, an arch rival of Mama-
loni, later in the year left the 
opposition and joined the government 
as minister for planning and national 
development. This followed one of 
Mamaloni’s political stunts, when in 
late August he fired four of his cabinet 
ministers, cut the number of ministries 
from nineteen to sixteen, and recruited 
Saemala. The ministers fired included 
Abe (Finance), Orodani (Justice), 
Musuota (Posts and Telecommunica-
tions), and George Luilamo (Com-
merce). Orodani and Musuota were at 
the time awaiting High Court trial for 
charges of corruption, while Luilamo 
in 1995 had been charged with corrup-
tion in relation to the Pavuvu logging 
issue and acquitted. On the other 
hand, Abe was in August interviewed 
in the controversial ABC Foreign Cor-
respondent program on logging and 
made remarks that apparently infuri-
ated Prime Minister Mamaloni.
Another important event, not only 
for the Solomon Islands, but for the 
rest of independent Melanesia, was 
Fiji’s decision to join the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group after four years as an 
observer. Commenting on Fiji’s inclu-
sion, the permanent secretary to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Benjamin 
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join will strengthen the organization’s 
base: “The benefits, especially in trade, 
social and economic cooperation and 
cultural exchange to each member of 
the msg should only increase with 
Fiji’s inclusion” (SS, 24 May 1996).
Other developments in the interna-
tional arena for the Solomon Islands 
included the increasing interest of 
Japan and the relationship with Aus-
tralia. Japan, over the last few years, 
has had an increasing involvement in 
terms of aid projects as well as closer 
diplomatic relations. It became the 
largest single bilateral aid donor, fund-
ing a number of important capital 
projects such as the construction of the 
country’s new international terminal, a 
fisheries depot and facilities for a new 
Honiara market, improvements to the 
Honiara water supply system, and the 
national fisheries project. The reasons 
for and implications of Japan’s increas-
ing interest in the Solomon Islands are 
interesting. Economically, the Solomon 
Islands has nothing much to offer in 
terms of trade, except for the fisheries 
resource, which is already dominated 
by the Japanese company, Taiyo 
Gyogyo. However, politically there is a 
lot at stake for Japan, which is cur-
rently trying to get support for its 
inclusion in the United Nations Secu-
rity Council; the Solomon Islands vote 
in the General Assembly could be cru-
cial. Also, Japan is trying to win votes 
for its campaign against the worldwide 
ban on whaling, and in 1995 the 
Solomon Islands voted in favor of 
Japan. The Solomon Islands and other 
countries in the Southwest Pacific are 
among Japan’s closest neighbors.
Relations with Australia were affected by the furor over logging, par-
ticularly the cancellation of Australian 
funding for the Timber Control Unit, 
which was established as part of a for-
estry aid project. This was designed to 
indicate Australia’s displeasure with 
the Solomon Islands government’s 
unsustainable logging policy. However, 
relations were beginning to improve by 
the last quarter of 1996. Foreign Min-
ister David Sitai visited Canberra in 
November and met his Australian 
counterpart, Alexander Downer. They 
discussed, among other things, the log-
ging issue. Sitai stated after the meet-
ing that there is now a better 
understanding between the two gov-
ernments (personal interview).
The 1997 election promises to be 
the most interesting to date for several 
reasons. First, there will be three gen-
erations of Solomon Islanders partici-
pating: those who were adults at the 
time of independence and participated 
in the first postindependence election 
in 1979; those born before indepen-
dence (and now in their late twenties) 
who were not old enough to partici-
pate in the 1979 and 1982 elections; 
and those born immediately after inde-
pendence, who will be participating 
for the first time. These three genera-
tions have diverse ideas, interests, and 
expectations that will provide innova-
tive campaign platforms and voting 
patterns, unlike previous elections, 
where the majority of voters and can-
didates belonged to the first two gener-
ations. Many of the present 
parliamentarians who climbed the pin-
nacles of power and became prominent 
during the colonial era are likely to be 
challenged and replaced in 1997. 
According to a survey conducted by 
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Trust’s hundreds of village workers, 
most parliamentarians are unlikely to 
be returned in the coming election. 
“Of the 2,108 survey returns almost 
two people out of every three voters 
are choosing not to return their
present parliamentarian if an election 
were held tomorrow” (Roughan 
1996).
Second, issues such as the economy, 
logging, corruption, leadership quali-
ties, and the Bougainville crisis will all 
feature prominently in the 1997 elec-
tion. These issues have become increas-
ingly important in the last two years. 
The number of corruption cases 
uncovered in 1996 is also bound to 
have an impact on the election results. 
Furthermore, voters’ awareness of 
their role and rights in the political 
process has undoubtedly improved 
since previous elections.
Third, despite this increasing aware-
ness, and the existence of political par-
ties, the personalities of candidates will 
continue to have a huge influence on 
voter choice. In a society with deeply 
rooted patronage-based electoral and 
coalition politics it will be a long time 
before parties become an important 
variable in determining election out-
comes. Patronage-based politics have 
intensified in recent years as a result of 
candidates’ access to substantial 
amounts of money that could be used 
for campaigning. This is particularly so 
for current members of parliament, 
who have personal control of project 
funds worth si$200,000 each year 
through the Constituency Develop-
ment Fund.
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Vanuatu
The year of living dangerously might 
aptly describe 1996 in Vanuatu.
The short life-expectancy for the 
newly elected Vohor-Lini govern-
ment, forecast in this review at the 
close of 1995, was quickly fulfilled and 
ushered in a year in which the institu-
tions of the state were continuously 
assaulted and their integrity danger-
ously threatened. The parliament, the 
government, the judiciary, the police 
and mobile force, and the Office of the 
Ombudsman were all at various times 
under attack and in peril. At year’s 
end, much as in a bad year for 
cyclones, the country had survived the 
storms and an apparent calm pre-
vailed, but the trail of destruction left 
in its wake was observable everywhere. 
It remains to be seen how well the 
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liamentary government recovers from 
the havoc.
On 4 January 1996, newly elected 
Prime Minister Serge Vohor married 
and on the tenth departed the country 
to attend the funeral of the late Presi-
dent of France François Mitterrand, 
leaving the government in the hands of 
his coalition partner and deputy, 
Father Walter Lini. Lini’s pre-election 
remark that “in politics there is no for-
giveness” was rapidly given practical 
expression in the replacement by party 
faithful of the directors of Civil Avia-
tion, Public Works, Health, and the 
Cultural Centre; the suspension of the 
heads of the Police Special Branch and 
the National Tourism Office; and 
public acknowledgment that the con-
tract of Chief Justice d’Imecourt, due 
to expire in March, would not be 
renewed. Lini’s failure to spare Union 
of Moderate Parties (ump) followers 
from his purge of public servants in 
portfolios under his control soon led to 
complaints that the government 
seemed to be a National United Party 
(nup)–ump coalition, not the other 
way round. That discontent early 
became a stalking-horse for former 
Prime Minister Carlot-Korman’s ambi-
tion to supplant his own party leader 
in the top job. Carlot-Korman was not 
reconciled to his loss of the prime min-
istership, and Amos Andeng, ump 
member for Ambrym, while less driven 
by personal ambition, was not recon-
ciled to his party’s failure to win gov-
ernment in its own right—a failure he 
blamed on Vohor and his faction in the 
party.
On 31 January the Speaker’s office 
announced that a motion of no confi-dence, signed by a majority of the 
members of parliament, had been 
lodged requesting an extraordinary 
session to debate it. Andeng and six 
ump members of parliament had 
joined the 20-member Unity Front (uf) 
opposition in Vanuatu’s 50-seat parlia-
ment to upset the new government. 
Vohor responded by accusing Carlot-
Korman of fomenting the move against 
him. Father Lini, foreseeing the need to 
have a competent justice to hear con-
stitutional cases, and in spite of his 
earlier remarks, proceeded to extend 
the contract of the chief justice for two 
years. On 7 February, Vohor sought
an order to prevent the parliament 
from sitting the following day, and 
when denied by the Supreme Court, 
stunned his collegues and the nation by 
announcing that he was resigning from 
the prime ministership with immediate 
effect. At 10 o’clock next morning 
President Leye Lenelcau signed a 
decree dissolving the parliament, an 
act that helped to explain Vohor’s 
sudden resignation. At noon, Radio 
Vanuatu announced that contrary to 
any reports, the president had not dis-
solved parliament. To add to the con-
fusion, later that night Radio Vanuatu 
broadcast a prerecorded interview 
with the president in which he dis-
cussed the reasons that had led him to 
issue the decree. Both local newspapers 
next day reported parliament’s dissolu-
tion. The attorney-general obtained a 
court order restraining publication of 
any such statement.
In the interval before Carlot-
Korman was elected prime minister on 
23 February, an extraordinary 
sequence of events took place: Lini, 
angered by the court’s failure to pre-
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commission of inquiry into the former 
prime minister, and the chief justice 
patently intended to dismiss him for 
gross misconduct; Vohor purported to 
revoke his resignation and resume 
office, and Lini, in his last hours as 
minister for justice, acted to suspend 
or dismiss the commissioner of police, 
the chief justice, the attorney-general, 
the clerk and deputy clerk of the par-
liament, and was considering action to 
remove the president! His actions were 
all beyond his legal authority and, 
taken together, seem calculated to have 
effected a coup d’état by administra-
tive means.
On 23 February, the floor of the 
House itself became a battleground, 
where the police were first asked to 
persuade the acting Speaker to vacate 
the chair for the conduct of the session, 
and later forcibly to remove from the 
chamber Vanuatu’s only woman mem-
ber of parliament, Hilda Lini. Follow-
ing the defeat of the Vohor government 
and the swearing-in of Carlot-Korman 
and his ministry, the day’s proceedings 
were immediately challenged in court. 
On 1 March, the chief justice, in con-
firming the validity of the appointment 
of the new prime minister and dismiss-
ing all the several grounds for Vohor 
or Lini’s application, observed: “The 
facts . . . show . . . that every officer of 
the Government or Parliament was 
doing his utmost to ensure that the due 
process of Parliamentary democracy 
should operate within the Constitution 
and the rule of law.”
However, a change in government 
did not bring greater stability or better 
governance; on the contrary, it served 
to introduce new elements of instabil-ity into the previous cohesion of the 
Unity Front, and even into the 
Vanua‘aku Party (vp) itself. There, dis-
satisfaction among backbenchers with 
the allocation of ministerial portfolios, 
which was seen as favoring the four 
smaller parties in the coalition, rankled 
to the point of some party members 
talking of crossing the floor to join in 
another vote of no confidence.
In April, parliament passed the 
1996 budget almost six months late 
and considered two reports by the 
ombudsman, one identifying serious 
problems in public administration aris-
ing from lack of guidance on correct 
procedures or the failure to observe 
them where they did exist, and the 
other castigating the failures of past 
governments to enact the constitution’s 
stipulations on multilingualism. They 
launched what was to become a volley 
of damaging broadsides against the 
government and ministers as the year 
progressed and more and more abuse 
of public office occurred.
The rift in the Union of Moderate 
Parties widened further in May when 
Vohor’s faction boycotted a national 
party congress convened by Carlot-
Korman, which then elected him presi-
dent. The party now found itself with 
two national executives. Proliferation 
of parties continued as a former high-
profile ump woman activist, Maria 
Kalsakau, founded her own “Liberal 
Party.” For the first time since indepen-
dence, two ni-Vanuatu, Kalkot Matas 
Kelekele and Vincent Lunabeck, were 
appointed justices of the Supreme 
Court.
Vanuatu’s Finance Minister Barak 
Sope, the mercurial leader of the 
Melanesian Progressive Party (mpp), 
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and backed some “adventurous” 
development proposals, including a 
geothermal power plant, a cement fac-
tory, a mine and tourist complex, the 
sale of investor passports, and the issue 
of a license to the “Dragon Bank” 
despite doubts about its record in 
Indonesia. Far and away his most 
imaginative initiative was the issue of 
ten us$10 million bank guarantees to 
be traded on international financial 
markets by an Australian, Peter Swan-
son, and some US business associates. 
The guarantees issued by the Reserve 
Bank of Vanuatu were signed by the 
prime minister, the finance minister, 
the governor of the Reserve Bank, and 
the first secretary of the Finance Minis-
try. Their total value was more than 
twice the value of Vanuatu’s national 
reserves and promised a risk-free profit 
from short-term interest of us$250 
million in two years.
The ombudsman completed an 
urgent investigation into the bank 
“scam” in early June and sent copies of 
her draft report to the prime minister, 
the foreign minister, and the deputy 
prime minister as required prior to 
public release. At the beginning of July, 
in the absence of any response from 
the government, the ombudsman pub-
licly released her report, in which she 
recommended that the president repri-
mand the prime minister and that the 
prime minister dismiss Sope, the gov-
ernor of the Reserve Bank, and the 
minister’s first secretary for their 
involvement in the matter. Carlot-Kor-
man, infuriated by the report’s publica-
tion, repudiated it as inaccurate and 
irrelevant, accused the ombudsman as 
a “foreigner” (despite her Vanuatu citi-zenship) of interference in Vanuatu’s 
internal affairs, and, following the 
recovery of the documents in London 
by the British police, claimed that his 
government’s actions had rectified the 
situation. Unable to discipline Sope, on 
whose continued support in parlia-
ment his government depended, Carlot-
Korman hit out at others and threat-
ened to withhold the salaries of staff at 
Radio Vanuatu if a news item on the 
ombudsman’s report was not with-
drawn. As soon as Swanson returned 
to Vanuatu from overseas he was 
arrested and remanded in custody with-
out bail by the Magistrate’s Court. On 
appeal, the chief justice agreed to grant 
bail, but on impossible terms—the re-
turn of the ten bank guarantees, a 
surety of 10 million vatu, and the sur-
render of all his travel documents, in-
cluding a Vanuatu diplomatic passport.
At the beginning of August, under 
increasing pressure from the publicity 
flowing from the ombudsman’s report 
and from other members of his own 
government, Carlot-Korman finally 
reshuffled his cabinet, moving Sope 
from Finance to Trade, Commerce and 
Industry; his mpp colleague Edgell 
from Lands; and Ravutia of the Fren 
Melanesie Party (fmp) from Tourism 
and Communications in order “to 
inject fresh blood” into the develop-
ment effort. Sope’s reaction was to 
enter immediately into negotiations 
with the opposition. Given cause, the 
prime minister dismissed him from the 
ministry entirely on 12 August. He 
also dismissed Sope’s associates Edgell 
and Tan Union (tu) members Boule-
kone and Ravutia, who had formed a 
new political grouping, the mtf (m for 
Melanesian Progressive Party, t for 
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for negotiating with the opposition. 
The sacked ministers all put it about 
publicly that they had resigned before 
being pushed, and the Vanua‘aku Party 
acquired an additional ministry in the 
reshuffle.
Thus strengthened, the opposition 
parties requested an extraordinary ses-
sion of parliament on 20 August, but 
the Speaker denied it on a technicality. 
Facing defeat in parliament, Carlot-
Korman threatened to prosecute his 
erstwhile ministers for “treason” in 
treating with the opposition to over-
throw the democratically elected gov-
ernment, a folly so extreme it is 
explicable only as a Napoleonic delu-
sion of Carlot-Korman’s that “l’état 
c’est moi.” The attorney-general 
advised that charges of sedition could 
be expected to be prosecuted success-
fully. The Speaker, now embroiled in 
the machinations of the prime minister 
to retain power at all cost, announced 
that the sitting already scheduled for 
26 August would be deferred until 30 
September. The opposition, whose 
ensuing petition for an extraordinary 
session was again rejected by the 
Speaker, applied to the Supreme Court 
for an order, and on 2 September the 
court held the Speaker’s ruling uncon-
stitutional and ordered the parliament 
to sit in seven days. The government, 
deeming the court’s order an infringe-
ment by the judiciary of the constitu-
tional principle of the separation of 
powers, took the matter to the Court 
of Appeal, which comprised two 
judges from New Zealand and one 
from Britain. On 16 September the 
appeal was dismissed and parliament 
ordered to sit on 25 September.Faced with irresistible numbers 
against him, Carlot-Korman brokered 
a reconciliation with Vohor and pub-
lished the points of their agreement in 
a joint memorandum of understanding 
on 19 September, under which the 
decisions of the rival party congresses 
were declared null and void, the court 
case over the competing claims to the 
name Union of Moderate Parties was 
withdrawn, and a Vohor adherent was 
appointed minister for Land and Natu-
ral Resources. Three days later Carlot-
Korman denounced Vohor for lying 
and abandoned the agreement. Vohor 
immediately signed an agreement with 
the opposition parties, under which he 
would again become prime minister. 
Parliament, failing of a quorum for its 
sitting on 25 September, reconvened 
on the thirtieth for only as long as it 
took the Speaker to close it on an 
alleged procedural irregularity. Back in 
court again for urgent redress, Justice 
Lunabeck ordered parliament to sit at 
7:30 the same night and stated that the 
Speaker should be tried for contempt 
of court. The opposition’s vote of no 
confidence in Carlot-Korman was car-
ried, and Vohor was elected prime 
minister. Barak Sope, for whose blood 
they had so recently bayed while in 
opposition, was installed as deputy 
prime minister. It took Vohor two 
weeks to complete his ministry, mostly 
because Willie Jimmy, who had 
become leader of the opposition after 
the change of government in February, 
had pretensions to the position of 
prime minister. Disappointed in those 
hopes, he threatened to bring down the 
government and stood out, resisting 
ultimate appointment as minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Immigration.
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acting prime minister in Vohor’s 
absence, Sope immediately moved to 
resuscitate the bank guarantee scheme, 
which he persisted in claiming was a 
good deal for Vanuatu. In the name of 
the Vanuatu government he demanded 
that the ten documents being held by 
British government authorities be 
returned. Fortunately, the British 
authorities managed to stall on techni-
cal legal grounds. Meantime the 
ombudsman released yet another 
report condemning Sope for alleged 
breaches of the leadership code, ille-
gally signing a $250,000 guarantee in 
his previous term as finance minister, 
and pressuring the National Provident 
Fund into a major investment in a sys-
tem of electronic banking known as 
Cybank. In response to the report’s 
publication in October, Sope asserted 
there was a conspiracy involving Aus-
tralia to prevent Vanuatu gaining real 
financial independence and, in a mem-
orable utterance, declared that “the 
fact that the Ombudsman can investi-
gate a Minister is detrimental to the 
operation of a democracy.”
On 19 October, in what could prove 
to be a move of profound significance 
for the future of stable government in 
Vanuatu, the leaders of the two major 
anglophone parties, Father Lini and 
Donald Kalpokas, conducted a formal 
custom reconciliation, apparently 
mending the rift that occurred in 1991 
and brought more than a decade of 
anglophone dominance of Vanuatu 
politics to an end. On 25 October, in a 
surprise move that must have flowed 
from the vp-nup reconciliation, Vohor 
sacked Sope and his mtf colleagues 
and replaced them with able and expe-rienced ministers from the Vanua‘aku 
Party. Vohor now enjoyed a large par-
liamentary majority and was relatively 
free from the perpetual threat of no-
confidence motions that had preoccu-
pied politicians and paralyzed all gov-
ernment programs continuously since 
the general elections in late 1995. It 
also produced, for the first time since 
1991, a two-thirds anglophone major-
ity in the twelve-member Council of 
Ministers.
In October the government was 
again in the Supreme Court seeking to 
set aside a decision of Carlot-Korman’s 
government to dissolve all six provin-
cial councils, for electoral irregularities 
in some and gross maladministration 
in others, and to conduct fresh elec-
tions on the twenty-ninth under a new 
electoral system thought to disadvan-
tage smaller parties. It failed in court, 
and elections were held on 4 Novem-
ber. They were notable only because 
support for the National United Party 
fell, and the new Liberal Party of 
Maria Kalsakau won its first seat in an 
election.
Lini’s animus toward the chief 
justice was of long standing, and in 
October he completed what he had 
failed to do in February by canceling 
his contract. D’Imecourt, however, 
remained a judge because procedurally 
only the president, acting on the rec-
ommendation of the Judicial Services 
Commission, could dismiss a judge. 
Frustrated by the law’s delay, the 
police were instructed to deport him 
with only two hours’ notice. The judge 
managed to obtain an injunction 
restraining their action but remained in 
a state of siege while prosecution and 
plaintiff’s counsel struggled daily over 
political reviews • melanesia 503its execution. Agreement was ulti-
mately reached that the chief justice 
and his family would leave Vanuatu 
and stay in Noumea pending a hearing 
of his claim of wrongful dismissal at 
the end of November. The Vanuatu 
government would in the interim con-
tinue to pay his salary, his accommo-
dation costs and per diem in Noumea, 
and would guarantee his return travel 
and entry to the country at the time of 
his lawsuit.
While politicians thus played power 
games and tied up the Supreme Court 
with adjudicating the constitutionality 
of their dubious stratagems and ruses, 
a far more dangerous threat to the 
exercise of democratic government 
was fermenting in the Vanuatu Mobile 
Force, the paramilitary wing of the 
police force.
In August, members of the Vanuatu 
Mobile Force held a meeting to discuss 
a rankling grievance over the nonpay-
ment of allowances going back over a 
number of years. At the time Hilda 
Lini referred publicly to rumors of a 
planned coup d’état that at the time 
seemed no more than a rhetorical 
trope in the midst of the government’s 
ever more desperate efforts to avoid 
defeat in a vote of no confidence. The 
rumor was quickly denied by the com-
missioner of police, but stung the 
prime minister’s office into ordering 
the sacking of the three Radio Vanuatu 
journalists responsible for the story.
In September, 107 members of the 
Vanuatu Mobile Force wrote to the 
minister for Home Affairs demanding 
payment of their outstanding allow-
ances, a demand that was rejected by 
the minister as an internal budgetary 
problem for the force to resolve. In response, they declared they would 
“stand down” from duty and refuse to 
obey the orders of their commanding 
officers. Frustrated by continued fail-
ure to redress their grievances, they 
decided to take the law into their own 
hands. In an act of rebellion on 12 
October, an armed detachment 
abducted the president from his bed, 
dragooned a Vanair pilot from his 
sleep, commandeered a domestic air-
craft, and before dawn took off for 
Malekula and a surprise early audience 
with the acting prime minister. Sope 
and Member of Parliament for Male-
kula Sato Kilman, rather less roughly 
constrained than the other two, agreed 
to return to Port Vila with them on the 
plane and to call a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers. At the same time 
the stand-down group detained their 
commanding officers under armed 
guard at Cook Barracks and forcibly 
abducted the police commissioner, 
their supreme commander. Later in the 
afternoon, at a meeting in Indepen-
dence Park, Sope announced the estab-
lishment of a commission of inquiry to 
investigate their claims and stated that 
no action would be taken against any 
member of the stand-down group. The 
Vanuatu Mobile Force’s actions and 
their impunity from reprisals embold-
ened them to reject nominations for 
acting commanders to replace those 
they had already driven from the bar-
racks, and created growing uneasiness 
and tension among people in the capi-
tal at the veto power over government 
the military now seemed to enjoy.
As a result of unrelated develop-
ments, Vohor, on 7 November, com-
plying with a decision of the nup 
congress, replaced Hilda Lini as minis-
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Lini, to whom Vohor delegated 
responsibility for resolving the crisis 
with the Vanuatu Mobile Force. The 
same day the vmf stand-down group, 
impatient with the failure of the com-
mission of inquiry to report to them by 
the end of the previous month, invaded 
the Department of Finance and 
roughly abducted an expatriate Aus-
tralian accountant, David Schupp, to 
Cook Barracks to explain the delay. 
This assault on a civilian—moreover, a 
foreign national —was seen as a seri-
ous escalation in their violence.
On 12 November, in a bold, coura-
geous, brilliantly planned and executed 
move, Lini surprised and arrested 150 
members of the Vanuatu Mobile Force 
with a small tactical force of police 
commanded by Peter Bong, the former 
head of the Criminal Investigation 
Department who had been forced into 
early retirement earlier in the year. All 
but about thirty of those arrested were 
released within twenty-four hours, but 
those detained were denied bail to face 
charges of kidnapping. They included 
Corporal Kilman, the most prominent 
negotiator for the stand-down group, 
and his elder brother Sato Kilman, MP, 
a former commanding officer of the 
Vanuatu Mobile Force and police com-
missioner. Sato Kilman was eventually 
granted bail, and the others enjoyed 
only a day or two of liberty at Christ-
mas–New Year before returning to the 
lock-up to await trial in late January.
Before year’s end, Hilda Lini’s 
loyalty to her brother finally failed, 
and she resigned from the National 
United Party, deploring the failure of 
all the major political parties to deliver 
development to the people. A few weeks afterward she announced the 
formation of a new “movement” the 
Tuvanuatu Movement, which she said 
was not a political party but a grass-
roots movement based on traditional 
economic and political systems to 
restore power to the chiefs.
In December, parliament sat in ordi-
nary session and passed the 1997 
budget, which revealed a deficit in gov-
ernment outlays in 1996 equal to 
almost 10 percent of the recurrent 
budget—a shortfall attributed to mas-
sive import duty exemptions granted 
by the former finance minister and to 
overspending on public sector salaries, 
which had increased by 30 percent 
since 1994. Budget priorities were 
focused on health and education and 
for savings to be found through down-
sizing public service numbers and 
improving service delivery. Regretta-
bly, the bill to enact the Leadership 
Code was withdrawn for unspecified 
reasons, but most probably because of 
provisions for it to be retrospective to 
the time of independence.
Moves were also reportedly afoot to 
mend the rift in the Union of Moderate 
Parties, and Carlot-Korman was 
reported to have accepted that Vohor 
would remain prime minister. These 
reports will again unsettle the coali-
tion, because, if effected, Vohor would 
need to drop nup or vp ministers to 
make way for his party colleagues. 
Rumors around Port Vila spoke of the 
National United Party losing out. But 
the recent reconciliation between Lini 
and Kalpokas may well militate 
against easy rearrangement among 
partners now accustomed to betrayal.
At year’s end, although the country 
had survived a succession of political 
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sacking of the chief justice, the 
Supreme Court had three major cases 
before it, all heavily weighted with 
political significance—the prosecution 
of Peter Swanson for his involvement 
in the bank guarantee scheme; the 
prosecution of the mutinous members 
of the Vanuatu Mobile Force, behind 
which lurks the shadow of a possible 
coup attempt involving other nonmili-
tary figures; and the appeal by the 
former chief justice against wrongful 
dismissal. On the positive side of the 
balance sheet, the government enjoyed 
a current majority in parliament large 
enough to enable the implementation 
of policy and programs for the first 
time in twelve months; it had quelled 
an insurrection in its armed force, 
which for several months had held a veto over all actions affecting their 
interests of which they did not 
approve; and it had removed a contro-
versial judge who had himself become 
a factor in local politicking in ways 
inimical to continued respect for the 
independence and impartiality of the 
bench. The year 1997 promises more 
“interesting times” in Vanuatu.
David Ambrose
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